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The consequences of staggered wage setting for the credibility of monetary policy

Author

Listed:
  • Olga Arratibel

    (Banco Central Hispanoamericano Madrid)

  • Jonathan P. Thomas

    (University of St Andrews)

Abstract

This paper introduces staggered wage contracts a la Taylor (1979)into a standard model of monetary policy credibility. The overlapping wage structure is shown to considerably exacerbate the time consistent inflation rate in Markov perfect equilibrium. If the central bank can commit to its monetary policy for one-period ahead, this reduces but does not eliminate the inflationary bias. Even if it can commit for a length of time equal to the nominal contract length (i.e., two-periods), this does not generally lead to a zero inflation outcome, and may even lead to negative inflation if the central bank's rate of time discount is sufficiently high.

Suggested Citation

  • Olga Arratibel & Jonathan P. Thomas, 2001. "The consequences of staggered wage setting for the credibility of monetary policy," Macroeconomics 0103002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0103002
    Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM-PC; pages: 30 ; figures: included within document. 30 pages, PDF
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/mac/papers/0103/0103002.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Taylor, John B, 1979. "Staggered Wage Setting in a Macro Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(2), pages 108-113, May.
    3. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
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    8. Fischer, Stanley, 1977. "Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(1), pages 191-205, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    staggered wage contracts time consistency commitment;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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