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The Labor Market Effects of Employer Recruitment Choice

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  • Jed DeVaro

    (Cornell University)

Abstract

I estimate a structural model of employer recruitment choice using data from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI), a 1992-1995 cross-sectional survey of employers and households in four metropolitan areas of the United States. I then conduct policy simulations to predict the effects of “information” policies such as the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 and “hiring incentive” policies such as the Welfare-to-Work and Work Opportunity tax credits. I find that the tax credits are superior to the information policy, both in improving placement rates for the low-skilled worker groups they target, and in increasing the starting wage distribution for these workers.

Suggested Citation

  • Jed DeVaro, 2005. "The Labor Market Effects of Employer Recruitment Choice," Labor and Demography 0508006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpla:0508006
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James Albrecht & Pieter A. Gautier & Susan Vroman, 2006. "Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 73(4), pages 869-891.
    2. George J. Stigler, 1962. "Information in the Labor Market," NBER Chapters, in: Investment in Human Beings, pages 94-105, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Jed Devaro, 2005. "Employer Recruitment Strategies and the Labor Market Outcomes of New Hires," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 43(2), pages 263-282, April.
    4. Montgomery, James D, 1991. "Social Networks and Labor-Market Outcomes: Toward an Economic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1407-1418, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Weinstein, Russell, 2018. "Employer screening costs, recruiting strategies, and labor market outcomes: An equilibrium analysis of on-campus recruiting," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 282-299.
    2. Oyer, Paul & Schaefer, Scott, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 20, pages 1769-1823, Elsevier.
    3. Martina Rebien & Michael Stops & Anna Zaharieva, 2020. "Formal Search And Referrals From A Firm'S Perspective," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 61(4), pages 1679-1748, November.
    4. Pinoli, Sara, 2008. "Screening ex-ante or screening on-the-job? The impact of the employment contract," MPRA Paper 11429, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Guillemette de Larquier & Géraldine Rieucau, 2017. "Job ads: A public but targeted information. A French Labour Force Surveys analysis (2003-2012) [Les annonces d’offre d’emploi : une information publique mais ciblée. Exploitation de l’enquête Emplo," Post-Print hal-01837156, HAL.
    6. Matthieu Manant & Serge Pajak & Nicolas Soulié, 2019. "Can social media lead to labor market discrimination? Evidence from a field experiment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 225-246, April.
    7. Jed DeVaro & Michael Waldman, 2012. "The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 91-147.
    8. Pinoli, Sara, 2007. "Employment Protection and Labor Productivity: Positive or Negative?," MPRA Paper 11775, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Chi Zhou & Wansheng Tang & Ruiqing Zhao, 2017. "An uncertain search model for recruitment problem with enterprise performance," Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 695-704, March.
    10. Michèle Forté & Sylvie Monchatre & Géraldine Rieucau & Marie Salognon & Ariel Sevilla & Carole Tuchszirer, 2012. "Pratiques de recrutement et sélectivité sur le marché du travail," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00971684, HAL.
    11. Blasco, Sylvie & Pertold-Gebicka, Barbara, 2013. "Employment policies, hiring practices and firm performance," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 12-24.
    12. Olugbenga Ajilore, 2012. "Did the Work Opportunity Tax Credit Cause Subsidized Worker Substitution?," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 26(3), pages 231-237, August.
    13. Manant, Matthieu & Pajak, Serge & Soulié, Nicolas, 2014. "Do recruiters 'like' it? Online social networks and privacy in hiring: a pseudo-randomized experiment," MPRA Paper 56845, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    • J - Labor and Demographic Economics

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