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The CO2 Abatement Game: Costs, Incentives and the Stability of a Sub-Global Coalition

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  • Mustafa Babiker

    (University of Colorado at Boulder)

Abstract

This paper studies the economic incentives and the institutional issues governing the outcomes of a short-term climate change policy package guided by the United Nations' Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Berlin Mandate initiatives. Game theoretic tools and the global trade-environment interface are explored within a 26-region, 13- commodity computable general equilibrium framework to characterize the incentives of OECD regions to comply with a non-binding agreement in a carbon abatement coalition. The results have shown that the achievement of such a coalition as well as its expansion by means of self-financed schemes are possible if suitable trade instruments are designed.

Suggested Citation

  • Mustafa Babiker, 1998. "The CO2 Abatement Game: Costs, Incentives and the Stability of a Sub-Global Coalition," Computational Economics 9807002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpco:9807002
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX/UNIX Sparc TeX; to print on HP/PostScript/Franciscan monk; pages: 55 ; figures: included. This work has one the Society of Computational Economics' contest for graduate student paper 1998
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    CGE Abatement CO2 coalition subgame connected-game;

    JEL classification:

    • C8 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs

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