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Toward a Positive Theory of Coalition Formation and Endogenous Instrumental Choice in Global Pollution Control

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  • Finus, Michael
  • Rundshagen, Bianca

Abstract

The paper analyzes the coalition formation process in a global emission game with asymmetric countries where the number of signatories, the abatement target and the policy instrument are chosen simultaneously. Exemplarily, a uniform emission reduction quota and an effluent charge are considered. Stability is analyzed in a supergame framework by applying the concept of coalition-proofness. The analysis also considers the impact of impatient agents, restricted and simple punishment profiles. Two main results may be mentioned: First, paradoxically, IEAs achieve only little (if signed at all) if the externality problem is distinct. Second, the authors' model helps to explain the frequent appearance of emission quotas in international pollution control despite the recommendations by economists to use market-based instruments like effluent charges. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Finus, Michael & Rundshagen, Bianca, 1998. "Toward a Positive Theory of Coalition Formation and Endogenous Instrumental Choice in Global Pollution Control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(1-2), pages 145-186, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:96:y:1998:i:1-2:p:145-86
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    As found on the RePEc Biblio, the curated bibliography for Economics:
    1. > Environmental and Natural Resource Economics > Climate economics > International agreements

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    1. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2006. "New roads to international environmental agreements: the case of global warming," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 7(4), pages 391-414, December.
    2. Alfred Endres & Michael Finus & Frank Lobigs, 2000. "Symbolische Umweltpolitik im Zeitalter der Globalisierung? – Zur Effektivität Internationaler Umweltverträge aus Ökonomischer Sicht," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 1(1), pages 73-91, February.
    3. Bigerna, Simona & Bollino, Carlo Andrea & Micheli, Silvia, 2016. "Renewable energy scenarios for costs reductions in the European Union," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 96(PA), pages 80-90.
    4. Michael Finus, 2004. "Modesty Pays: Sometimes!," Working Papers 2004.68, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    5. Michael Finus & Ekko Ierland & Rob Dellink, 2006. "Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 271-291, August.
    6. Froyn, Camilla Bretteville & Hovi, Jon, 2008. "A climate agreement with full participation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 317-319, May.
    7. Alfred Endres, 2008. "Ein Unmöglichkeitstheorem für die Klimapolitik?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 9(3), pages 350-382, August.
    8. Meißner, Nathalie, 2013. "The incentives of private companies to invest in protected area certificates: How coalitions can improve ecosystem sustainability," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 148-158.
    9. Finus, Michael & Tjotta, Sigve, 2003. "The Oslo Protocol on sulfur reduction: the great leap forward?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2031-2048, September.
    10. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2003. "Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game: How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-Making," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0317, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    11. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 2003. "How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 2003.62, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

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