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Global Tradeable Carbon Permits, Participation Incentives, and Transfers

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  • Larsen, Bjorn
  • Shah, Anwar

Abstract

This paper evaluates alternative global tradeable permit allocations to stabilize world Carbon emissions at 1987 levels by 2000. An important group of countries would have little incentive to participate in a treaty based on widely discussed permit allocation principles. Each non-OECD country should be allocated permits equivalent to its projected baseline emissions and OECD countries should be allocated the remaining permits given the world emissions target. Under the proposed regime, the authors find that OECD costs would be about 50 percent lower than unilateral reduction; non-OECD countries will enjoy substantial gains; and world costs will be about 68 percent lower. Copyright 1994 by Royal Economic Society.

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  • Larsen, Bjorn & Shah, Anwar, 1994. "Global Tradeable Carbon Permits, Participation Incentives, and Transfers," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 841-856, Supplemen.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:46:y:1994:i:0:p:841-56
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    1. Anwar Shah & Bjorn Larsen, 2014. "Carbon taxes, the greenhouse effect, and developing countries," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(1), pages 353-402, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marc Vielle & Alain L. Bernard, 1998. "Un exemple d'utilisation : le coût de politiques de réduction des gaz à effet de serre," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 136(5), pages 33-48.
    2. Panayotou, Theodore & Sachs, Jeffrey D. & Zwane, Alix Peterson, 2002. "Compensation for "Meaningful Participation" in Climate Change Control: A Modest Proposal and Empirical Analysis," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 437-454, May.
    3. Zhou, P. & Wang, M., 2016. "Carbon dioxide emissions allocation: A review," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 47-59.
    4. Jie, Wu & Yan, Xia, 2013. "Allocation of carbon permits within regions and its regional economy impact: a multi-regional general equilibrium analysis," Conference papers 332414, Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project.
    5. GERMAIN, Marc & VAN STEENBERGHE, Vincent, 2001. "Constraining equitable allocations of tradable greenhouse gases emission quotas by acceptability," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2001005, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    6. Karp, Larry S. & Liu, Xuemei, 1998. "Valuing Tradeable Co2 Permits For Oecd Countries," CUDARE Working Papers 25054, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    7. Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 1998. "A general model for CO2 regulation: the case of Denmark," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 33-44, January.
    8. Karp, Larry S. & Liu, Xuemei, 1999. "Welfare Gains under Tradeable CO₂ Permits," CUDARE Working Papers 6254, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    9. Adam Rose & Brandt Stevens & Jae Edmonds & Marshall Wise, 1998. "International Equity and Differentiation in Global Warming Policy," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(1), pages 25-51, July.
    10. Adam Rose & Brandt Stevens, 1998. "A Dynamic Analysis of Fairness in Global Warming Policy: Kyoto, Buenos Aires, and Beyond," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 1, pages 329-362, November.
    11. Mustafa Babiker, 1998. "The CO2 Abatement Game: Costs, Incentives and the Stability of a Sub-Global Coalition," Computational Economics 9807002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Kohn, Robert E., 2001. "Unilateral transfer of abatement capital," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 85-95, April.
    13. Emilio Padilla & Jordi Roca, 2004. "The Proposals for a European Tax on CO 2 and Their Implications for Intercountry Distribution," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 27(3), pages 273-295, March.
    14. Azqueta Oyarzún, Diego & Sotelsek, Daniel F., 1999. "Comparative advantages and the exploitation of environmental resources," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), August.
    15. Babiker, Mustafa H., 2001. "The CO2 abatement game: Costs, incentives, and the enforceability of a sub-global coalition," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 1-34, January.
    16. David Appels, 2001. "Forest rotation lengths under carbon sequestration payments," Others 0110007, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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