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Choice Problems with a "Reference" Point

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Abstract

In many decision scenarios, one has to choose an element from a set S given some reference point e. For the case where S is a subset of the Euclidean space , we axiomatize the choice method that selects the point in S that is closet to e.
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Suggested Citation

  • A. Rubinstein & L. Zhou, 1998. "Choice Problems with a "Reference" Point," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s3, Economics Department, Princeton University.
    • Handle: RePEc:wop:prinet:00s3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 1992. "Bargaining problems with claims," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 19-33, August.
    2. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    3. P. L. Yu, 1973. "A Class of Solutions for Group Decision Problems," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(8), pages 936-946, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jose Apesteguia & Miguel Ballester, 2009. "A theory of reference-dependent behavior," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(3), pages 427-455, September.
    2. Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael, 2018. "Costly switching from a status quo," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 55-70.
    3. Dean, Mark & Kıbrıs, Özgür & Masatlioglu, Yusufcan, 2017. "Limited attention and status quo bias," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 93-127.
    4. Carvajal, Andres & Ray, Indrajit & Snyder, Susan, 2004. "Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: testable restrictions and identification," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-2), pages 1-40, February.
    5. BOSSERT, Walter & SUZUMURA, Kotaro, 2006. "Non-Deteriorating Choice without Full Transitivity," Cahiers de recherche 2006-13, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    6. M. Voorneveld & A. Nouweland & R. McLean, 2011. "Axiomatizations of the Euclidean compromise solution," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(3), pages 427-448, August.
    7. Roee Teper, 2010. "Probabilistic Dominance and Status Quo Bias," Working Paper 5864, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    8. Mark Dean & Ozgur Kibris & Yusufcan Masatlioglu, 2014. "Limited Attention and Status Quo Bias," Working Papers 2014-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    9. Kovach, Matthew, 2020. "Twisting the truth: foundations of wishful thinking," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
    10. Majumdar, Dipjyoti, 2004. "An axiomatic characterization of Bayes' Rule," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 261-273, May.
    11. Francesco Farina & Eugenio Peluso & Ernesto Savaglio, 2005. "Ranking opportunity sets in the space of functionings," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 2(2), pages 105-116, January.
    12. Basu, Pathikrit, 2019. "Bayesian updating rules and AGM belief revision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 455-475.
    13. Tserenjigmid, Gerelt, 2019. "Choosing with the worst in mind: A reference-dependent model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 631-652.
    14. Naumova, N. I., 2002. "Nonsymmetric equal sacrifice solutions for claim problem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-18, January.
    15. William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.
    16. Andreas Tutić, 2015. "Revealed norm obedience," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(2), pages 301-318, February.
    17. Sudhölter, Peter & Zarzuelo, José M., 2013. "Extending the Nash solution to choice problems with reference points," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 219-228.
    18. Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael & Tsur, Matan, 2018. "Aspiration-based choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 935-956.
    19. Riella, Gil & Teper, Roee, 2014. "Probabilistic dominance and status quo bias," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 288-304.
    20. Victor H. Aguiar & Roland Pongou & Roberto Serrano & Jean-Baptiste Tondji, 2018. "An Index of Unfairness," Working Papers 2018-9, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    21. Forgo, F. & Szidarovszky, F., 2003. "On the relation between the Nash bargaining solution and the weighting method," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 108-116, May.
    22. Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael, 2015. "An experiment on aspiration-based choice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 512-526.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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