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Land inequality, government ideology and agricultural protection

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  • Olper, Alessandro

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  • Olper, Alessandro, 2007. "Land inequality, government ideology and agricultural protection," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 67-83, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfpoli:v:32:y:2007:i:1:p:67-83
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    11. van Bastelaer, Thierry, 1998. "The Political Economy of Food Pricing: An Extended Empirical Test of the Interest Group Approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(1-2), pages 43-60, July.
    12. Giovanni Maggi & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
    13. Magee, Christopher, 2002. "Endogenous trade policy and lobby formation: an application to the free-rider problem," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 449-471, August.
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    15. Pecorino, Paul, 1998. "Is There a Free-Rider Problem in Lobbying? Endogenous Tariffs, Trigger Strategies, and the Number of Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 652-660, June.
    16. Pushan Dutt & Devashish Mitra, 2016. "Endogenous trade policy through majority voting: an empirical investigation," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Trade Policy Theory, Evidence and Applications, chapter 4, pages 67-93, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    17. Devashish Mitra, 2016. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Trade Policy Theory, Evidence and Applications, chapter 1, pages 3-21, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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    29. Easter, K. William & Palanisami, Kuppannan, 1986. "Tank Irrigation In India And Thailand: An Example Of Common Property Resource Management," Staff Papers 13888, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
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