Causes and Effects of Wealth Inequality: visibility leads to a tradeoff between social mobility and wealth satisfaction
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More about this item
Keywords
Disparity; Wealth; Investment game; Experiment; Information;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EXP-2021-02-08 (Experimental Economics)
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