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The industrial organisation of economic policy preparation in the Netherlands

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  • Butter, Frank A.G. den

    (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen en Econometrie (Free University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics Sciences, Business Administration and Economitrics)

Abstract

In the institutional set-up of (economic) policy preparation in the Netherlands there is ample interaction between scientific insights and policy proposals. This Dutch polder model lays much emphasis on the social dialogue to come to an agreement on, and have public support for policy proposals. It was very much the idea of Jan Tinbergen winner of the first Nobel price in economics to have a clear separation in policy preparation between (i) trying to reach consensus on the working of the economy, as formalised in econometric models; (ii) come to a compromise on policy goals between the various minority parties of the government; and (iii) rely on independent and undisputed data collection by an autonomous Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). The aim of this separation of responsibilities is to guarantee, as much as possible, the scientific quality of policy preparation and at the same time to gain public support for policy measures so that implementation costs are kept low. This paper discusses the working of this institutional set-up, its historical background and the mechanisms of quality control and reputation which are essential for the interaction between scientific knowledge and policy preparation to remain fruitful.

Suggested Citation

  • Butter, Frank A.G. den, 2006. "The industrial organisation of economic policy preparation in the Netherlands," Serie Research Memoranda 0007, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
    • Handle: RePEc:vua:wpaper:2006-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. den Butter, Frank A. G. & Morgan, Mary S., 1998. "What makes the models-policy interaction successful?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 443-475, July.
    2. Frank A.G. den Butter & Robert H.J. Mosch, 2003. "The Dutch Miracle: Institutions, Networks, and Trust," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(2), pages 362-391, June.
    3. Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 1999. "A trade union model with endogenous militancy: interpreting the French case," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 355-373, September.
    4. Olivier Blanchard & Jean Tirole, 2004. "Redesigning the Employment Protection System," De Economist, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 1-20, March.
    5. Mueller,Dennis C. (ed.), 1997. "Perspectives on Public Choice," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521553773, September.
    6. Bjerkholt, Olav, 1998. "Interaction between model builders and policy makers in the Norwegian tradition," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 317-339, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. F. J. H. Don & J. P. Verbruggen, 2006. "Models and methods for economic policy: 60 years of evolution at CPB," Statistica Neerlandica, Netherlands Society for Statistics and Operations Research, vol. 60(2), pages 145-170, May.
    2. Nataliia Sokolovska & Benedikt Fecher & Gert G. Wagner, 2019. "Communication on the Science-Policy Interface: An Overview of Conceptual Models," Publications, MDPI, vol. 7(4), pages 1-15, November.
    3. Frank A.G. den Butter & Marc de Graaf & André Nijsen, 2009. "The Transaction Costs Perspective on Costs And Benefits of Government Regulation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-013/3, Tinbergen Institute.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic policy; Polder model; Social dialogue; Interaction between science and policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E66 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General Outlook and Conditions
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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