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Strategic Priority-Based Course Allocation

Author

Listed:
  • Antonio Romero-Medina

    (Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

  • Matteo Triossi

    (Dept. of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venice)

Abstract

We present the conditional acceptance mechanism for the course allocation problem. This mechanism combines features of the immediate acceptance and the student optimal stable mechanisms. It implements the set of stable allocations in both Nash and undominated Nash equilibria under substitutable preferences and priorities. We model the post-allocation adjustment mechanism using a repeated version of the mechanism. This repeated mechanism reduces the wastefulness of out-of-equilibrium play and implements the set of stable allocation in Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium under slot-speci#c preferences and priorities. Both mechanisms are easily implementable, reduce the complexity of eliciting students' preferences, and mimic the features of the mechanisms currently in use.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2022. "Strategic Priority-Based Course Allocation," Working Papers 13, Venice School of Management - Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
    • Handle: RePEc:vnm:wpdman:199
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    Keywords

    conditional acceptance; immediate acceptance; multi-unit assignment problem; stability.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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