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John Charles Harsanyi

Author

Listed:
  • John A. Weymark

    (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University)

Abstract

This article provides an overview of the main events in the life of John Harsanyi and a summary of his research on decision-theoretic foundations for utilitarianism, cooperative bargaining theory, games of incomplete information, and equilibrium selection in noncooperative games.

Suggested Citation

  • John A. Weymark, 2006. "John Charles Harsanyi," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0607, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0607
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu06-w07.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2006
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. van Damme, Eric, 1995. "On the Contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 24(1), pages 3-11.
    2. van Damme, E.E.C. & Weibull, J.W., 1995. "Equilibrium in strategic interaction : The contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten," Other publications TiSEM de9d99b7-7e74-4c92-90fc-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Sen, Amartya, 2005. "Social choice theory," Handbook of Mathematical Economics, in: K. J. Arrow & M.D. Intriligator (ed.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, edition 2, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1073-1181, Elsevier.
    4. Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, April.
    5. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
    6. Roger B. Myerson, 2004. "Comments on "Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, I--III Harsanyi's Games with Incoplete Information"," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(12_supple), pages 1818-1824, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    John Harsanyi; utilitarianism; bargaining theory; games of incomplete information; equilibrium selection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B31 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals - - - Individuals

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