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Hypergame Analysis in E-Commerce: A Preliminary Report

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  • Maxime Leclerc
  • Brahim Chaib-draa

Abstract

In usual game theory, it is normally assumed that "all the players see the same game"", i.e., they are aware of each other's strategies and preferences. This assumption is very strong for real life where differences in perception affecting the decision making process seem to be the rule rather the exception. Attempts have been made to incorporate misperceptions of various types, but most of these attempts are based on quantities (as probabilities, risk factors, etc.) which are too subjective in general. One approach that seems to be very attractive is to consider that the players are trying to play ""different games"" in a hypergame. In this paper, we present a hypergame approach as an analysis tool in the context of multiagent environments. Precisely, we first sketch a brief formal introduction to hypergames. Then we explain how agents can interact through communication or through a mediator when they have different views and particularly misperceptions on others' games. After that, we show how agents can take advantage of misperceptions. Finally, we conclude and present some future work." Dans les jeux classiques, il est supposé que "tous les joueurs voient le même jeu'', i.e., que les joueurs sont au courant des stratégies et des préférences des uns et des autres. Aux vu des applications réelles, cette supposition est très forte dans la mesure où les différences de perception affectant la prise de décision semblent plus relevées de la règle que de l'exception. Des tentatives ont été faites, par le passé, pour incorporer les distorsions aux niveaux des perceptions, mais la plupart de ces tentatives ont été essentiellement basées sur le ""quantitatif"" (comme les probabilités, les facteurs de risques, etc.) et par conséquent, trop subjectives en général. Une approche qui semble être attractive pour pallier à cela, consiste à voir les joueurs comme jouant ""différents jeux'' dans une sorte d'hyper-jeu. Dans ce papier, nous présentons une approche ""hyper-jeu'' comme outil d'analyse entre agents dans le cadre d'un environnement multi-agent. Nous donnons un aperçu (très succinct) de la formalisation d'un tel hyper-jeux et nous expliquerons ensuite, comment les agents pourraient intervenir via un agent-médiateur quand ils ont des perceptions différentes. Après cela, nous expliquerons comment les agents pourraient tirer avantage des perceptions différentes."

Suggested Citation

  • Maxime Leclerc & Brahim Chaib-draa, 2002. "Hypergame Analysis in E-Commerce: A Preliminary Report," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-66, CIRANO.
  • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2002s-66
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, April.
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    3. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
    4. Ronald Fagin & Joseph Y. Halpern & Yoram Moses & Moshe Y. Vardi, 2003. "Reasoning About Knowledge," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262562006, April.
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