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Does the Identity of the Third-Party Payer Matters for Prescribing Doctors?

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TNF-alpha inhibitors represent one of the most important areas of biopharmaceuticals by sales, with three blockbusters accounting for 8 per cent of total pharmaceutical sale in Norway. Novelty of the paper is to examine, with the use of a unique natural policy experiment in Norway, to what extent the price responsiveness of prescription choices is affected when the identity of the third-party payer changes. The three dominating drugs in this market, Enbrel, Remicade, and Humira, are substitutes, but have had different and varying funding schemes - hospitals and the national insurance plan. A stochastic structural model for the three drugs, covering demand and price setting, is estimated in a joint maximum likelihood approach. We find that doctors are more responsive when the costs are covered by the hospitals compared to when costs are covered by national insurance

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  • Morten Dalen Dag & Locatelli Marilena & Sorisio Enrico & Strom Steinar, 2012. "Does the Identity of the Third-Party Payer Matters for Prescribing Doctors?," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201208, University of Turin.
    • Handle: RePEc:uto:dipeco:201208
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    1. Toshiaki Iizuka, 2007. "Experts' agency problems: evidence from the prescription drug market in Japan," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(3), pages 844-862, September.
    2. O'Brien, Bernie, 1989. "The effect of patient charges on the utilisation of prescription medicines," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 109-132, March.
    3. Coscelli, Andrea & Shum, Matthew, 2004. "An empirical model of learning and patient spillovers in new drug entry," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 213-246, October.
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    1. Dag Morten Dalen & Marilena Locatelli & Steinar Strøm, 2018. "An Equilibrium Model Estimated on Pharmaceutical Data," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 46(3), pages 281-296, September.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms

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