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Virtual vs. Standard Strike: An Experiment

Author

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  • Alessandro Innocenti
  • Antonio Nicita

Abstract

In this paper we compare - in the laboratory - stoppage and virtual strike. Our experiment confirms that higher wages offered by an employer lead to considerably more costly effort provision. The number of strikes, the level of efforts and average total payoffs are higher under virtual strike than under standard strike. However, when standard strike is associated with reciprocal externalities, it induces higher effort levels, higher payoffs and an extremely reduced number of strikes than virtual strike. It is unclear whether this behavior re?ects reciprocity or other forms of social preferences. However our results might explain why standard strikes rather than virtual ones are generally adopted by workers.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Innocenti & Antonio Nicita, 2009. "Virtual vs. Standard Strike: An Experiment," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 026, University of Siena.
    • Handle: RePEc:usi:labsit:026
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    File URL: http://www.labsi.org/wp/labsi26.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, 2010. "The case for the virtual strike," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 9(1), pages 75-75, April.
    2. Ernst Fehr & Alexander Klein & Klaus M Schmidt, 2007. "Fairness and Contract Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 121-154, January.
    3. Gary Charness & Peter Kuhn, 2007. "Does Pay Inequality Affect Worker Effort? Experimental Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(4), pages 693-723.
    4. Gary Charness, 2004. "Attribution and Reciprocity in an Experimental Labor Market," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(3), pages 665-688, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, 2009. "The Case for Virtual Strike.An Appraisal of the Italian Proposal," Econometica Working Papers wp08, Econometica.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    virtual strike; cooperation; reciprocity; fairness; experiments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
    • K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
    • M55 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Contracting Devices

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