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Monetary Union, Asymmetric Recession, and Exit

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  • Keuschnigg, Christian

Abstract

We propose a New Keynesian DSGE model of the Eurozone and analyze an asymmetric recession in a vulnerable member state characterized by a trilemma of high public debt, weak banks, and deteriorating competitiveness. We compare macroeconomic adjustment under continued membership with two exit scenarios that introduce flexible exchange rates and autonomous monetary policy. An exit with stable investor expectations could significantly dampen the short-run impact. Stabilization is achieved by a targeted monetary expansion combined with depreciation. However, investor panic may lead to escalation, aggravate the recession and delay the recovery.

Suggested Citation

  • Keuschnigg, Christian, 2022. "Monetary Union, Asymmetric Recession, and Exit," Economics Working Paper Series 2206, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:usg:econwp:2022:06
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Currency union; exchange rate flexibility; fiscal consolidation; sovereign debt; banks;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
    • F45 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Macroeconomic Issues of Monetary Unions
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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