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Allocating ideas: Horizontal competition in tournaments

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Abstract

We develop a stylized model of horizontal and vertical competition in tournaments with two competing firms. The sponsor cares about the quality of the design but also about the design location. A priori not even the sponsor knows his preferred design location, which is only discovered once he has seen the actual proposals. We show that the more efficient firm is more likely to be conservative when choosing the design location. Also, to get some differentiation in design locations, the cost difference between contestants can neither be too small nor too big. Therefore, if the sponsor mainly cares about the design location, participation in the tournaments by the two lowest cost contestants cannot be optimal for the sponsor.

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  • Juan J. Ganuza & Esther Hauk, 2002. "Allocating ideas: Horizontal competition in tournaments," Economics Working Papers 594, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:594
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    1. Irmen, Andreas & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1998. "Competition in Multi-characteristics Spaces: Hotelling Was Almost Right," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 76-102, January.
    2. Lizzeri, Alessandro & Persico, Nicola, 2000. "Uniqueness and Existence of Equilibrium in Auctions with a Reserve Price," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 83-114, January.
    3. Richard L. Fullerton & R. Preston McAfee, 1999. "Auctioning Entry into Tournaments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 573-605, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrea Fosfuri & Thomas Rønde, 2005. "Leveraging Resistance to Change and the Skunk Works Model of Innovation," CIE Discussion Papers 2007-10, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, revised Jun 2007.
    2. Emilie Dargaud & Carlo Reggiani, 2015. "On The Price Effects Of Horizontal Mergers: A Theoretical Interpretation," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 236-255, July.
    3. Carlo Reggiani, 2014. "Spatial Price Discrimination in the Spokes Model," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 628-649, September.
    4. Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima, 2010. "Patent licensing, bargaining, and product positioning," ISER Discussion Paper 0775, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    5. Carlo Reggiani, "undated". "Optimal Differentiation and Spatial Competition: The Spokes Model with Product Delivery," Discussion Papers 09/13, Department of Economics, University of York.
    6. Igor Letina & Armin Schmutzler, 2019. "Inducing Variety: A Theory Of Innovation Contests," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1757-1780, November.
    7. Brueggemann, Julia & Meub, Lukas, 2015. "Experimental evidence on the effects of innovation contests," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 251, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    8. Andrea Fosfuri & Thomas Rønde, 2009. "Leveraging Resistance to Change and the Skunk Works Model of Innovation," Post-Print hal-00699208, HAL.
    9. Fosfuri, Andrea & Rønde, Thomas, 2009. "Leveraging resistance to change and the skunk works model of innovation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 274-289, October.
    10. Brüggemann, Julia & Meub, Lukas, 2017. "Experimental evidence on the effects of innovation contests," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 72-83.
    11. Emilie Dargaud & Carlo Reggiani, "undated". "Horizontal Mergers in the Spokes Model," Discussion Papers 09/12, Department of Economics, University of York.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Horizontal and vertical competition; tournaments;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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