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Bid coordination in sponsored search auctions: Detection methodology and empirical analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Francesco Decarolis
  • Maris Goldmanis
  • Antonio Penta
  • Ksenia Shakhgildyan

Abstract

Bid delegation to specialized intermediaries is common in the auction systems used to sell internet advertising. When the same intermediary concentrates the demand for ad space from competing advertisers, its incentive to coordinate client bids might alter the functioning of the auctions. Using proprietary data from auctions held on a major search engine, this study develops a methodology to detect bid coordination. It also presents a strategy to estimate a bound on the search engine revenue losses imposed by coordination relative to a counterfactual benchmark of competitive bidding. In the data, coordination is detected in 55 percent of the cases of delegated bidding observed and the associated upper bound revenue loss for the search engine ranges between 5.3 and 10.4 percent.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco Decarolis & Maris Goldmanis & Antonio Penta & Ksenia Shakhgildyan, 2021. "Bid coordination in sponsored search auctions: Detection methodology and empirical analysis," Economics Working Papers 1782, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:1782
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Francesco Decarolis & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2021. "From Mad Men to Maths Men: Concentration and Buyer Power in Online Advertising," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(10), pages 3299-3327, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    online advertising; sponsored search auctions; delegation; common agency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce

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