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An experimental study of the generalized second price auction

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  • Bae, Jinsoo
  • Kagel, John H.

Abstract

We experimentally investigate the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used to sell advertising positions in online search engines. Two contrasting click through rates (CTRs) are studied, under both static complete and dynamic incomplete information settings. Subjects consistently bid above the Vikrey–Clarke–Grove's (VCG) like equilibrium favored in the theoretical literature. However, bidding, at least qualitatively, satisfies the contrasting outcomes predicted under the two CTRs. For both CTRs, outcomes under the static complete information environment are similar to those in later rounds of the dynamic incomplete information environment. This supports the theoretical literature that uses the static complete information model as an approximation to the dynamic incomplete information under which advertising positions are allocated in field settings.

Suggested Citation

  • Bae, Jinsoo & Kagel, John H., 2019. "An experimental study of the generalized second price auction," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 44-68.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:63:y:2019:i:c:p:44-68
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.10.006
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    Cited by:

    1. Peyman Khezr & Vijay Mohan & Lionel Page, 2024. "Strategic Bidding in Knapsack Auctions," Papers 2403.07928, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2024.
    2. Karthik Kannan & Vandith Pamuru & Yaroslav Rosokha, 2023. "Analyzing Frictions in Generalized Second-Price Auction Markets," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 34(4), pages 1437-1454, December.
    3. Savas Dayanik & Semih O. Sezer, 2023. "Optimal dynamic multi-keyword bidding policy of an advertiser in search-based advertising," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 97(1), pages 25-56, February.
    4. Margarida V. B. Santos & Isabel Mota & Pedro Campos, 2023. "Analysis of online position auctions for search engine marketing," Journal of Marketing Analytics, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(3), pages 409-425, September.
    5. Marina Núñez & Francisco Robles, 2023. "Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2023/440, University of Barcelona School of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Online advertising; Sponsored search auctions; Generalized second price auction;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • M3 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising

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