Alexander Frug
Personal Details
First Name: | Alexander |
Middle Name: | |
Last Name: | Frug |
Suffix: | |
RePEc Short-ID: | pfr394 |
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public] | |
https://sites.google.com/site/alexanderfrug/ | |
Affiliation
Departament d'Economia i Empresa
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Barcelona School of Economics (BSE)
Barcelona, Spainhttp://www.econ.upf.edu/
RePEc:edi:deupfes (more details at EDIRC)
Research output
Jump to: Working papers ArticlesWorking papers
- Eliaz, Kfir & Fershtman, Daniel & Frug, Alexander, 2021. "On the Optimal Scheduling of Attention," CEPR Discussion Papers 16364, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2020.
"Optimal Contracts with Randomly Arriving Tasks,"
Working Papers
1147, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2021. "Optimal Contracts with Randomly Arriving Tasks," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(637), pages 1905-1918.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2020. "Optimal contracts with randomly arriving tasks," Economics Working Papers 1690, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Eliaz, Kfir & Frug, Alexander, 2020.
"Toxic Types and Infectious Communication Breakdown,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
15511, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kfir Eliaz & Alexander Frug, 2020. "Toxic Types and Infectious Communication Breakdown," Working Papers 1224, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Kfir Eliaz & Alexander Frug, 2020. "Toxic types and infectious communication breakdown," Economics Working Papers 1759, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Alexander Frug, 2019.
"On strategic transmission of gradually arriving information,"
Economics Working Papers
1691, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Alexander Frug, 2020. "On Strategic Transmission of Gradually Arriving Information," Working Papers 1146, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2019.
"Monotone contracts,"
Economics Working Papers
1647, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2019. "Monotone Contracts," Working Papers 1085, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Alexander Frug, 2016.
"Strategic Gradual Learning and Information Transmission,"
Working Papers
937, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Frug, Alexander, 2018. "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 594-615.
- Alexander Frug, 2016. "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Economics Working Papers 1544, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Eliaz, Kfir & Frug, Alexander, 2016.
"When to Learn What in Bilateral Trade,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
11350, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kfir Eliaz & Alexander Frug, 2016. "When to Learn what in Bilateral Trade," Working Papers 936, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Kfir Eliaz & Alexander Frug, 2016.
"Bilateral trade with strategic gradual learning,"
Economics Working Papers
1543, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 2017.
- Eliaz, Kfir & Frug, Alexander, 2018. "Bilateral trade with strategic gradual learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 380-395.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2016.
"Dynamic nonmonetary incentives,"
Economics Working Papers
1545, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2019. "Dynamic Non-monetary Incentives," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 111-150, November.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2016. "Dynamic Nonmonetary Incentives," Working Papers 938, Barcelona School of Economics.
Articles
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2021.
"Optimal Contracts with Randomly Arriving Tasks,"
The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(637), pages 1905-1918.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2020. "Optimal Contracts with Randomly Arriving Tasks," Working Papers 1147, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2020. "Optimal contracts with randomly arriving tasks," Economics Working Papers 1690, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2019.
"Dynamic Non-monetary Incentives,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 111-150, November.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2016. "Dynamic Nonmonetary Incentives," Working Papers 938, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2016. "Dynamic nonmonetary incentives," Economics Working Papers 1545, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Eliaz, Kfir & Frug, Alexander, 2018.
"Bilateral trade with strategic gradual learning,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 380-395.
- Kfir Eliaz & Alexander Frug, 2016. "Bilateral trade with strategic gradual learning," Economics Working Papers 1543, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 2017.
- Frug, Alexander, 2018.
"Strategic gradual learning and information transmission,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 594-615.
- Alexander Frug, 2016. "Strategic Gradual Learning and Information Transmission," Working Papers 937, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Alexander Frug, 2016. "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Economics Working Papers 1544, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Frug, Alexander, 2016. "A note on optimal cheap talk equilibria in a discrete state space," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 180-185.
- Frug, Alexander, 2016. "Dynamic cheap talk with static informational control," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 118-120.
Citations
Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.Working papers
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2020.
"Optimal Contracts with Randomly Arriving Tasks,"
Working Papers
1147, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2021. "Optimal Contracts with Randomly Arriving Tasks," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(637), pages 1905-1918.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2020. "Optimal contracts with randomly arriving tasks," Economics Working Papers 1690, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Cited by:
- Mariagiovanna Baccara & SangMok Lee & Leeat Yariv, 2021.
"Task Allocation and On-the-job Training,"
NBER Working Papers
29312, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mariagiovanna Baccara & SangMok Lee & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Task Allocation and On-the-job Training," Working Papers 2021-21, Princeton University. Economics Department..
- Yariv, Leeat & Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Lee, SangMok, 2020. "Task Allocation and On-the-job Training," CEPR Discussion Papers 15356, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Mariagiovanna Baccara & SangMok Lee & Leeat Yariv, 2020. "Task Allocation and On-the-job Training," Working Papers 270, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
- Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Lee, SangMok & Yariv, Leeat, 2023. "Task allocation and on-the-job training," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2019.
"Monotone contracts,"
Economics Working Papers
1647, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2019. "Monotone Contracts," Working Papers 1085, Barcelona School of Economics.
Cited by:
- Forand, Jean Guillaume & Zapal, Jan, 2020. "Production priorities in dynamic relationships," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
- Alexander Frug, 2016.
"Strategic Gradual Learning and Information Transmission,"
Working Papers
937, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Frug, Alexander, 2018. "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 594-615.
- Alexander Frug, 2016. "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Economics Working Papers 1544, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Cited by:
- Matteo Escud'e & Ludvig Sinander, 2019.
"Slow persuasion,"
Papers
1903.09055, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
- Escudé, Matteo & Sinander, Ludvig, 2023. "Slow persuasion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
- Eliaz, Kfir & Frug, Alexander, 2018.
"Bilateral trade with strategic gradual learning,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 380-395.
- Kfir Eliaz & Alexander Frug, 2016. "Bilateral trade with strategic gradual learning," Economics Working Papers 1543, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 2017.
- Kfir Eliaz & Alexander Frug, 2016.
"When to Learn what in Bilateral Trade,"
Working Papers
936, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Eliaz, Kfir & Frug, Alexander, 2016. "When to Learn What in Bilateral Trade," CEPR Discussion Papers 11350, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hidir, Sinem, 2017. "Information Acquisition and Credibility in Cheap Talk," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 36, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
- Eliaz, Kfir & Frug, Alexander, 2016.
"When to Learn What in Bilateral Trade,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
11350, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kfir Eliaz & Alexander Frug, 2016. "When to Learn what in Bilateral Trade," Working Papers 936, Barcelona School of Economics.
Cited by:
- Alexander Frug, 2016.
"Strategic Gradual Learning and Information Transmission,"
Working Papers
937, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Frug, Alexander, 2018. "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 594-615.
- Alexander Frug, 2016. "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Economics Working Papers 1544, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Kfir Eliaz & Alexander Frug, 2016.
"Bilateral trade with strategic gradual learning,"
Economics Working Papers
1543, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 2017.
- Eliaz, Kfir & Frug, Alexander, 2018. "Bilateral trade with strategic gradual learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 380-395.
Cited by:
- Alexander Frug, 2016.
"Strategic Gradual Learning and Information Transmission,"
Working Papers
937, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Frug, Alexander, 2018. "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 594-615.
- Alexander Frug, 2016. "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Economics Working Papers 1544, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2016.
"Dynamic nonmonetary incentives,"
Economics Working Papers
1545, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2019. "Dynamic Non-monetary Incentives," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 111-150, November.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2016. "Dynamic Nonmonetary Incentives," Working Papers 938, Barcelona School of Economics.
Cited by:
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2020.
"Optimal contracts with randomly arriving tasks,"
Economics Working Papers
1690, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2020. "Optimal Contracts with Randomly Arriving Tasks," Working Papers 1147, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2021. "Optimal Contracts with Randomly Arriving Tasks," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(637), pages 1905-1918.
- Christoph Siemroth, 2024.
"Ending Wasteful Year‐End Spending: On Optimal Budget Rules In Organizations,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 65(3), pages 1163-1188, August.
- Siemroth, Christoph, 2022. "Ending Wasteful Year-End Spending: On Optimal Budget Rules in Organizations," Economics Discussion Papers 32231, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Lipnowski, Elliot & Ramos, João, 2020.
"Repeated delegation,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
- Elliot Lipnowski & Joao Ramos, 2015. "Repeated Delegation," Working Papers 15-02, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Elliot Lipnowski & Joao Ramos, 2018. "Repeated Delegation," 2018 Meeting Papers 1292, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Chen, Yi, 2022. "Dynamic delegation with a persistent state," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
- Rantakari, Heikki, 2023. "How to reward honesty?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 207(C), pages 129-145.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2019.
"Monotone Contracts,"
Working Papers
1085, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2019. "Monotone contracts," Economics Working Papers 1647, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Stephen Spear & Cheng Wang, "undated".
"When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts,"
GSIA Working Papers
2002-E5, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Spear, Stephen E. & Wang, Cheng, 2005. "When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 239-256, February.
- Spear, Stephen E. & Wang, Cheng, 2005. "When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts," Staff General Research Papers Archive 11443, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Matthew Mitchell, 2018. "Free (Ad)vice," 2018 Meeting Papers 1194, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Forand, Jean Guillaume & Zapal, Jan, 2020. "Production priorities in dynamic relationships," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
Articles
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2021.
"Optimal Contracts with Randomly Arriving Tasks,"
The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(637), pages 1905-1918.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2020. "Optimal Contracts with Randomly Arriving Tasks," Working Papers 1147, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2020. "Optimal contracts with randomly arriving tasks," Economics Working Papers 1690, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2019.
"Dynamic Non-monetary Incentives,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 111-150, November.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2016. "Dynamic Nonmonetary Incentives," Working Papers 938, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2016. "Dynamic nonmonetary incentives," Economics Working Papers 1545, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Eliaz, Kfir & Frug, Alexander, 2018.
"Bilateral trade with strategic gradual learning,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 380-395.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Kfir Eliaz & Alexander Frug, 2016. "Bilateral trade with strategic gradual learning," Economics Working Papers 1543, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 2017.
- Frug, Alexander, 2018.
"Strategic gradual learning and information transmission,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 594-615.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Alexander Frug, 2016. "Strategic Gradual Learning and Information Transmission," Working Papers 937, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Alexander Frug, 2016. "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Economics Working Papers 1544, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Frug, Alexander, 2016.
"A note on optimal cheap talk equilibria in a discrete state space,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 180-185.
Cited by:
- Sémirat, S. & Forges, F., 2021. "Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: the single-crossing case," Working Papers 2021-03, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
- Alexander Frug, 2016.
"Strategic Gradual Learning and Information Transmission,"
Working Papers
937, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Frug, Alexander, 2018. "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 594-615.
- Alexander Frug, 2016. "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Economics Working Papers 1544, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Daniele Condorelli & Massimiliano Furlan, 2023. "Cheap Talking Algorithms," Papers 2310.07867, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
- Stéphan Sémirat & Françoise Forges, 2022. "Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval: the single crossing case," Post-Print hal-03231673, HAL.
- Sémirat, Stéphan & Forges, Françoise, 2022. "Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: The single-crossing case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 242-263.
- Frug, Alexander, 2016.
"Dynamic cheap talk with static informational control,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 118-120.
Cited by:
- Ichihashi, Shota, 2019.
"Limiting Sender's information in Bayesian persuasion,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 276-288.
- Shota Ichihashi, 2019. "Limiting Sender’s Information in Bayesian Persuasion," Staff Working Papers 19-10, Bank of Canada.
- Alexander Frug, 2016.
"Strategic Gradual Learning and Information Transmission,"
Working Papers
937, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Frug, Alexander, 2018. "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 594-615.
- Alexander Frug, 2016. "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Economics Working Papers 1544, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Ichihashi, Shota, 2019.
"Limiting Sender's information in Bayesian persuasion,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 276-288.
More information
Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.Statistics
Access and download statistics for all items
NEP Fields
NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 12 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.- NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (10) 2016-11-06 2016-11-06 2019-04-15 2019-04-22 2020-02-03 2020-02-03 2020-02-10 2020-02-10 2021-01-04 2021-05-17. Author is listed
- NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (4) 2019-04-15 2019-04-22 2020-02-03 2020-02-10. Author is listed
- NEP-GTH: Game Theory (3) 2020-02-03 2021-01-11 2021-05-17. Author is listed
- NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (3) 2016-11-06 2020-02-03 2020-02-10. Author is listed
- NEP-ORE: Operations Research (3) 2019-04-15 2019-04-22 2020-02-03. Author is listed
- NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (2) 2020-02-03 2020-02-10
- NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2016-11-06
Corrections
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