Tax Administration Reform and Taxpayer Compliance in India
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- Arindam Das-Gupta & Shanto Ghosh & Dilip Mookherjee, 2003. "Tax Administration Reform and Taxpayer Compliance in India," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-137, Boston University - Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Graetz, Michael J. & Reinganum, Jennifer F. & Wilde, Louis L., "undated". "The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement," Working Papers 589, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Kahn, Charles M & Silva, Emilson C D & Ziliak, James P, 2001. "Performance-Based Wages in Tax Collection: The Brazilian Tax Collection Reform and Its Effects," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(468), pages 188-205, January.
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- David Alejandro Camargo González & Cynthia Lucía Támara Tafur & Siara Vanessa Deluquez Gómez & María Paula Baptiste González, 2017. "Cuadernos fiscales no. 6. Administración tributaria: reflexiones para Colombia desde el derecho comparado," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, number 974.
- Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2019.
"Inequality, good governance, and endemic corruption,"
International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(5), pages 999-1017, October.
- Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2017. "Inequality, Good Governance and Endemic Corruption," GLO Discussion Paper Series 142, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
- Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2017. "Inequality, Good Governance and Endemic Corruption," Departmental Working Papers 201713, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2017. "Inequality, Good Governance and Endemic Corruption," IZA Discussion Papers 11149, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2017. "Inequality, Good Governance and Endemic Corruption," Working Papers id:12242, eSocialSciences.
- Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2018. "Inequality, good governance and endemic corruption," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2018-19, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
- Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2019.
"Inequality, good governance, and endemic corruption,"
International Tax and Public Finance,
Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(5), pages 999-1017, October.
- Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2017. "Inequality, Good Governance and Endemic Corruption," Departmental Working Papers 201713, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2018. "Inequality, good governance and endemic corruption," WIDER Working Paper Series 019, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
- Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2017. "Inequality, Good Governance and Endemic Corruption," IZA Discussion Papers 11149, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2017. "Inequality, Good Governance and Endemic Corruption," Working Papers id:12242, eSocialSciences.
- Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2017. "Inequality, Good Governance and Endemic Corruption," GLO Discussion Paper Series 142, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
- Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2024. "Herding, taxpayer's rent seeking and endemic corruption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 533-546.
- Alejandro Esteller-Moré, 2011. "Is the tax administration just a money machine? Empirical evidence on redistributive politics," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 275-299, September.
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