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Are Electoral Coalitions Harmful for Democratic Consolidation in Africa?

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  • Danielle Resnick

Abstract

Electoral coalitions are becoming increasingly popular among opposition parties in Africa because they offer many advantages with respect to reducing party fragmentation and increasing incumbent turnovers. At the same time, however, they are often comprised of parties that are defined predominantly by their leaders' personalities and exhibit little differentiation in terms of their policy orientation.

Suggested Citation

  • Danielle Resnick, 2011. "Are Electoral Coalitions Harmful for Democratic Consolidation in Africa?," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2011-007, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2011-007
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    File URL: https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/wp2011-007.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
    2. Marc Debus, 2009. "Pre-electoral commitments and government formation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 45-64, January.
    3. Marc Morjé Howard & Philip G. Roessler, 2006. "Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(2), pages 365-381, April.
    4. Laver, Michael & Shepsle, Kenneth A., 1990. "Coalitions and Cabinet Government," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 873-890, September.
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