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From Conflict to Reconstruction: Reviving the Social Contract

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  • Tony Addison
  • Mansoob Murshed

Abstract

Contemporary civil wars are rooted in a partial or complete breakdown of the social contract, often involving disputes over public spending, resource revenues, and taxation. A feasible social contract gives potential rebels something akin to a transfer. When this is improbable, and the potential spoils are rich then warfare is more likely. Grievances, not just pure greed, motivate war. But peace deals can also break down when commitments are not credible. Successful reconstruction after war must rebuild the social contract.

Suggested Citation

  • Tony Addison & Mansoob Murshed, 2001. "From Conflict to Reconstruction: Reviving the Social Contract," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2001-48, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:dp2001-48
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    File URL: https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/dp2001-48.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. repec:fth:oxesaf:2001-3 is not listed on IDEAS
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    5. Tony Addison & S. Mansoob Murshed, 2002. "Credibility and Reputation in Peacemaking," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 39(4), pages 487-501, July.
    6. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2000. "Contract or War? On the Consequences of a Broader View of Self-Interest in Economics," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 44(1), pages 5-16, March.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Svetlana P. Glinkina & Dorothy J. Rosenberg, 2003. "Social and Economic Decline as Factors in Conflict in the Caucasus," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2003-18, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    2. Sonali Deraniyagala, 2005. "The Political Economy of Civil Conflict in Nepal," Oxford Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(1), pages 47-62.
    3. Matovic, Violeta & Wörgötter, Andreas, 2007. "How does the Economy Matter for Terrorism," MPRA Paper 32968, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2007.
    4. Jose Cuesta & Syed Mansoob Murshed, 2012. "On the micro-foundations of contract versus conflict with implications for international peace-making," International Journal of Development and Conflict, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, vol. 2(2), pages 1250009-125.
    5. Jose Cuesta & Mansoob Murshed, 2008. "The Micro-foundations of Social Contracts, Civil Conflicts and International Peace-Making," Research Working Papers 8, MICROCON - A Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conflict.
    6. Sumon Kumar Bhaumik & Ira N Gang & Myeong-Su Yun, 2009. "Rationality as a Barrier to Peace: Micro-evidence from Kosovo," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 51(2), pages 242-264, June.
    7. David M Malone & Heiko Nitzschke, 2010. "Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: What We Know, What We Need to Know," Working Papers id:3226, eSocialSciences.
    8. Syed Mansoob Murshed & Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin, 2009. "Revisiting the greed and grievance explanations for violent internal conflict," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(1), pages 87-111.
    9. Ghassan Dibeh, 2008. "The business cycle in postwar Lebanon," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(2), pages 145-160.
    10. S. Mansoob Murshed & Scott Gates, 2005. "Spatial–Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(1), pages 121-134, February.
    11. Mansoob Murshed & Scott Gates, 2004. "Spatial Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal," WIDER Working Paper Series RP2004-43, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    12. José Cuesta & Syed Mansoob Murshed, 2008. "Las Micro-Fundaciones de contrato frente a conflictos con consecuencias en la paz internacional," Research Department Publications 4592, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    13. Ghassan Dibeh, 2005. "The Political Economy of Postwar Reconstruction in Lebanon," WIDER Working Paper Series RP2005-44, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    14. David M. Malone & Heiko Nitzschke, 2005. "Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: What We Know, What We Need to Know," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2005-07, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    15. Svetlana P. Glinkina & Dorothy J. Rosenberg, 2003. "The socioeconomic roots of conflict in the Caucasus," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(4), pages 513-524.

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