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Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges

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  • Barbera, S.
  • Masso, J.
  • Serizawa, S.

Abstract

Strategy-proof social choice functions are characterized for societies where the space of alternatives is any full dimensional compact subset of a Euclidean space and all voters have generalized single-peaked preferences.
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Suggested Citation

  • Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Serizawa, S., 1998. "Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 272-291, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:25:y:1998:i:2:p:272-291
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Serizawa Shigehiro, 1995. "Power of Voters and Domain of Preferences Where Voting by Committees Is Strategy-Proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 599-608, December.
    2. Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O, 1995. "Strategy-Proof Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 51-87, January.
    3. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
    4. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
    5. Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-519, March.
    6. Kim C. Border & J. S. Jordan, 1983. "Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(1), pages 153-170.
    7. Shigehiro Serizawa, 1999. "Strategy-Proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 121-146, January.
    8. Yves Sprumont, 1995. "Strategyproof Collective Choice in Economic and Political Environments," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 68-107, February.
    9. Barbera, Salvador & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 1997. "Voting under Constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 298-321, October.
    10. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
    11. Gibbard, Allan, 1977. "Manipulation of Schemes That Mix Voting with Chance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(3), pages 665-681, April.
    12. Alcalde, Jose & Barbera, Salvador, 1994. "Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(3), pages 417-435, May.
    13. Barbera Salvador & Gul Faruk & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993. "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 262-289, December.
    14. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    15. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. John Weymark, 2011. "A unified approach to strategy-proofness for single-peaked preferences," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 529-550, December.
    2. Barbera, Salvador & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2005. "Voting by committees under constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 185-205, June.
    3. Massó, Jordi & Moreno de Barreda, Inés, 2011. "On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 467-484, June.
    4. Berga, Dolors & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2000. "Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with One Public Good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 39-61, January.
    5. Amoros, Pablo, 1999. "Efficiency and income redistribution in the single-peaked preferences model with several commodities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 341-349, June.
    6. Bonifacio, Agustín G. & Massó, Jordi, 2020. "On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 219-238.
    7. Aziz, Haris & Chan, Hau & Lee, Barton E. & Parkes, David C., 2020. "The capacity constrained facility location problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 478-490.
    8. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2020. "Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(2), pages 237-258, March.
    9. Bordes, G. & Laffond, G. & Le Breton, Michel, 2012. "Euclidean Preferences, Option Sets and Strategy Proofness," TSE Working Papers 12-302, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    10. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Tomas Sjostrom & Takehiko Yamato, 2003. "Secure Implementation:Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Reconsidered," Discussion papers 03019, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    11. Shuhei Morimoto & Shigehiro Serizawa & Stephen Ching, 2013. "A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 871-911, March.
    12. John A. Weymark, 2008. "Strategy‐Proofness and the Tops‐Only Property," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(1), pages 7-26, February.
    13. Lars-Gunnar Svensson & Pär Torstensson, 2008. "Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(2), pages 181-196, February.
    14. Schummer, James & Vohra, Rakesh V., 2002. "Strategy-proof Location on a Network," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 405-428, June.
    15. Pablo Amorós, 2002. "Single-peaked preferences with several commodities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(1), pages 57-67.
    16. Georges Bordes & Gilbert Laffond & Michel Le Breton, 2011. "Euclidean preferences, option sets and strategyproofness," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 469-483, December.
    17. , & ,, 2012. "Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    18. Brady, Richard L. & Chambers, Christopher P., 2015. "Spatial implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 200-205.
    19. Bordes, G. & Laffond, G. & Le Breton, Michel, 2012. "Euclidean Preferences, Option Sets and Strategy Proofness," IDEI Working Papers 717, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    20. Salvador Barberà, 2010. "Strategy-proof social choice," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 828.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    21. Itai Feigenbaum & Jay Sethuraman & Chun Ye, 2017. "Approximately Optimal Mechanisms for Strategyproof Facility Location: Minimizing L p Norm of Costs," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 42(2), pages 434-447, May.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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