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A Model for Team Managers with Self-serving Workers

Author

Listed:
  • Brice Corgnet

    (Universidad de Navarra)

Abstract

We develop a model of team formation in which workers learn about their level of ability. We show that insufficient cooperation may arise as workers learn positively about their own skills. We then build a model for team managers and establish that their objectivity in assessing coworkers' abilities may facilitate cooperation among agents. This is the case because managers are able to design team contracts based on workers' true performances. Our work provides a motive for the existence of team managers in the absence of asymmetry of information.

Suggested Citation

  • Brice Corgnet, 2007. "A Model for Team Managers with Self-serving Workers," Faculty Working Papers 08/07, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra.
    • Handle: RePEc:una:unccee:wp0807
    as

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    File URL: http://www.unav.edu/documents/10174/6546776/1188465773_WP2_Brice.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Charles C. Manz & Greg L. Stewart, 1997. "Attaining Flexible Stability by Integrating Total Quality Management and Socio-Technical Systems Theory," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 8(1), pages 59-70, February.
    2. Corgnet, Brice, 2005. "Team formation and biased self-attribution," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB wb055214, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
    3. Barton H. Hamilton & Jack A. Nickerson & Hideo Owan, 2003. "Team Incentives and Worker Heterogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Teams on Productivity and Participation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(3), pages 465-497, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Teams; Self-serving biases; Behavioral contract theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management

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