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Estate Taxation and Human Capital with Information Externalities

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Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of estate taxation when firms cannot directly observe worker skill levels. Imperfect labor market signaling gives rise to an information externality that causes workers to free-ride off of others' human capital acquisition. Inherited wealth exacerbates the information externality because risk-averse workers with larger inheritances exert less effort to acquire skills. By reducing these inheritances, an estate tax induces greater skill acquisition effort, resulting in a higher number of skilled workers, and in many cases, increased wages and output. In a parametrized model, I establish that the optimal estate tax rate is significantly above zero.

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  • Aaron Hedlund, 2014. "Estate Taxation and Human Capital with Information Externalities," Working Papers 1415, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    • Handle: RePEc:umc:wpaper:1415
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    12. repec:mea:meawpa:13267 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Ben Lockwood, 1991. "Information Externalities in the Labour Market and the Duration of Unemployment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(4), pages 733-753.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ashley C. Craig, 2023. "Optimal Income Taxation with Spillovers from Employer Learning," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 82-125, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    information externalities; signaling; free-rider problem; labor markets; bequests; inheritance taxes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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