Is Partial Tax Harmonization Desirable?
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Conconi, Paola & Perroni, Carlo & Riezman, Raymond, 2008. "Is partial tax harmonization desirable," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1-2), pages 254-267, February.
- Conconi, Paola & Perroni, Carlo & Riezman, Raymond, 2007. "Is Partial Tax Harmonization Desirable?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 795, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Riezman, Raymond & Perroni, Carlo & Conconi, Paola, 2006. "Is Partial Tax Harmonization Desirable?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5761, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
- Paola Conconi & Carlo Perroni, 2002. "Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-in in International Negotiations," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5839, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Conconi, Paola & Perroni, Carlo, 2009.
"Do credible domestic institutions promote credible international agreements?,"
Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 160-170, September.
- Perroni, Carlo & Conconi, Paola, 2006. "Do Credible Domestic Institutions Promote Credible International Agreements?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5762, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Paola Conconi & Carlo Perroni, 2009. "Do Credible Domestic Institutions Promote Credible International Agreements?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/98549, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Edwards, Jeremy & Keen, Michael, 1996.
"Tax competition and Leviathan,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 113-134, January.
- Jeremy Edwards & Michael Keen, 1994. "Tax Competition and Leviathan," CESifo Working Paper Series 57, CESifo.
- Jeremy Edwards & Michael Keen, 1994. "Tax competition and Leviathon," IFS Working Papers W94/07, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1987.
"Pareto efficient and optimal taxation and the new new welfare economics,"
Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 991-1042,
Elsevier.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1987. "Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New New Welfare Economics," NBER Working Papers 2189, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe & Edward C. Prescott, 1988. "Time consistency and policy," Staff Report 115, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Benhabib, Jess & Rustichini, Aldo, 1997.
"Optimal Taxes without Commitment,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 231-259, December.
- Benhabib, J. & Rustichini, A., 1996. "Optimal Taxes Without Commitment," Working Papers 96-18, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Paul R. Krugman, 1991.
"The move toward free trade zones,"
Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 7-58.
- Paul R. Krugman, 1991. "The move toward free trade zones," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, vol. 76(Nov), pages 5-25.
- Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006.
"The Power to Tax,"
Cambridge Books,
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922, September.
- Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 1980. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521233293.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1992.
"The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(4), pages 689-701.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1990. "The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration," NBER Working Papers 3460, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1991. "The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 501, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Conconi, Paola & Perroni, Carlo, 2002.
"Issue linkage and issue tie-in in multilateral negotiations,"
Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 423-447, August.
- Conconi, Paola & Perroni, Carlo, 2000. "Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-in in Multilateral Negotiations," Economic Research Papers 269329, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Paola Conconi & Carlo Perroni, 2001. "Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-in in Multilateral Negotiations," CESifo Working Paper Series 601, CESifo.
- Conconi, P. & Perroni, C., 2000. "Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-in in Multilateral Negotiations," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 558, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Konrad, Kai A. & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 1999.
"Fortress Building in Global Tax Competition,"
Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 156-167, July.
- Konrad, K.A. & Schjelderup, G., 1998. "Fortress Building in Global Tax Competition," Papers 17/98, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
- Bacchetta, Philippe & Espinosa, Maria Paz, 1995.
"Information sharing and tax competition among governments,"
Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1-2), pages 103-121, August.
- Bacchetta, P. & Paz Espinosa, M., 1992. "Information Sharing and Tax Competition Among Governments," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 173.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Philippe Bacchetta & Maria Paz Espinosa, 1993. "Information Sharing and Tax Competition Among Governments," CEPR Financial Markets Paper 0028, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX..
- Devereux, Michael P. & Lockwood, Ben & Redoano, Michela, 2008.
"Do countries compete over corporate tax rates?,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 1210-1235, June.
- Devereux, Michael P. & Lockwood, Ben & Redoano, Michela, 2002. "Do Countries Compete over Corporate Tax Rates?," Economic Research Papers 269454, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Devereux, Michael & Lockwood, Ben & Redoano, Michela, 2002. "Do Countries Compete over Corporate Tax Rates?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3400, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Devereux, Michael P & Lockwood, Ben & Redoano, Michela, 2002. "Do Countries Compete Over Corporate Tax Rates?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 642, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1990. "Supply-Side Economics: An Analytical Review," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(2), pages 293-316, April.
- Slemrod, Joel & Hansen, Carl & Procter, Roger, 1997.
"The seesaw principle in international tax policy,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 163-176, August.
- Joel Slemrod & Carl Hansen & Roger Procter, 1994. "The Seesaw Principle in International Tax Policy," NBER Working Papers 4867, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Torsten Persson, 1992.
"Politics and economic policy,"
Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics
62, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Persson, T., 1992. "Politics and Economic Policy," Papers 518, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael, 1993.
"Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 877-892, September.
- Ravi Kanbur & Michael Keen, 1991. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size," Working Paper 819, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- Rogers, Carol Ann, 1987. "Expenditure taxes, income taxes, and time-inconsistency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 215-230, March.
- Wilson, John Douglas & Wildasin, David E., 2004. "Capital tax competition: bane or boon," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(6), pages 1065-1091, June.
- Patrick J. Kehoe, 1989. "Policy Cooperation Among Benevolent Governments May Be Undesirable," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 56(2), pages 289-296.
- Fischer, Stanley, 1980. "Dynamic inconsistency, cooperation and the benevolent dissembling government," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 93-107, May.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Krishanu Karmakar & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2014. "Fiscal Competition versus Fiscal Harmonization: A Review of the Arguments," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1431, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
- Keisuke Kawachi & Hikaru Ogawa & Taiki Susa, 2019.
"Endogenizing government’s objectives in tax competition with capital ownership,"
International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(3), pages 571-594, June.
- Keisuke Kawachi & Hikaru Ogawa & Taiki Susa, 2017. "Endogenizing Government's Objectives in Tax Competition with Capital Ownership," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1054, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Edwards, Jeremy & Keen, Michael, 1996.
"Tax competition and Leviathan,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 113-134, January.
- Jeremy Edwards & Michael Keen, 1994. "Tax competition and Leviathon," IFS Working Papers W94/07, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Jeremy Edwards & Michael Keen, 1994. "Tax Competition and Leviathan," CESifo Working Paper Series 57, CESifo.
- Chu, Angus C. & Yang, C.C., 2012. "Fiscal centralization versus decentralization: Growth and welfare effects of spillovers, Leviathan taxation, and capital mobility," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 177-188.
- Gaëtan Nicodème, 2006. "Corporate tax competition and coordination in the European Union: What do we know? Where do we stand?," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 250, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
- Michael Keen & Kai A. Konrad, 2012. "International Tax Competition and Coordination," Working Papers international_tax_competi, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
- Lai, Yu-Bong, 2010. "The political economy of capital market integration and tax competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 475-487, December.
- Lisa Grazzini & Tanguy Van Ypersele, 2003. "Fiscal Coordination and Political Competition," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 305-325, April.
- Franto Ricka, 2012. "The right-wing power of small countries," Working Papers 153, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Office of the Chief Economist.
- Satoshi Kasamatsu & Daiki Kishishita, 2021. "Tax competition and political agency problems," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(4), pages 1782-1810, November.
- Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI, 2016.
"Implementing Tax Coordination and Harmonization through Voluntary Commitment,"
Working Papers
P181, FERDI.
- Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2016. "Implementing Tax Coordination and Harmonization through Voluntary Commitment," Working Papers halshs-01332058, HAL.
- Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI, 2016. "Implementing Tax Coordination and Harmonization through Voluntary Commitment," Working Papers 201612, CERDI.
- Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI, 2016. "Implementing Tax Coordination and Harmonization through Voluntary Commitment," Working Papers P181, FERDI.
- Wang, Wenming & Ogawa, Hikaru, 2018. "Objectives of governments in tax competition: Role of capital supply elasticity," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 225-231.
- Zeynep Burcu BULUT-ÇEVİK, 2020. "Fiscal Decentralization with a Redistribution Rule vs. Fiscal Centralization," Sosyoekonomi Journal, Sosyoekonomi Society, issue 28(44).
- Hans Pitlik, 2005. "Folgt die Steuerpolitik in der EU der Logik des Steuerwettbewerbs," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 256/2005, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
- Fuest, Clemens & Huber, Bernd, 2001.
"Why is there so little tax coordination? The role of majority voting and international tax evasion,"
Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2-3), pages 299-317, April.
- Fuest, Clemens & Huber, Bernd, 2001. "Why is there so little tax coordination? The role of majority voting and international tax evasion," Munich Reprints in Economics 20310, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Eckhard Janeba & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2009.
"The Welfare Effects of Tax Competition Reconsidered: Politicians and Political Institutions,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(539), pages 1143-1161, July.
- Eckhard Janeba & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2009. "The Welfare Effects of Tax Competition Reconsidered: Politicians and Political Institutions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(539), pages 1143-1161, July.
- Janeba, Eckhard & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2008. "The Welfare Effects of Tax Competition Reconsidered: Politicians and Political Institutions," Discussion Papers 2008/22, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
- Sonja Brangewitz & Sarah Brockhoff, 2012. "Stability of Coalitional Equilibria within Repeated Tax Competition," Working Papers CIE 48, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
- Brangewitz, Sonja & Brockhoff, Sarah, 2014. "Stability of coalitional equilibria within repeated tax competition," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 461, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002.
"Political economics and public finance,"
Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659,
Elsevier.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, "undated". "Political Economics and Public Finance," Working Papers 149, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1999. "Political Economics and Public Finance," NBER Working Papers 7097, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political Economics and Public Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2235, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Zodrow, George R, 2003. "Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in the European Union," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 10(6), pages 651-671, November.
More about this item
Keywords
Commitment; Partial coordination; Tax competition;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/98550. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Benoit Pauwels (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ecsulbe.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.