IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/uwarer/269329.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-in in Multilateral Negotiations

Author

Listed:
  • Conconi, Paola
  • Perroni, Carlo

Abstract

We describe a model of international, multidimensional policy coordination where countries can enter into selective and separate agreements with di®erent partners along di®erent policy dimensions. The model is used to examine the implications of negotiation tie-in|the requirement that agreements must span multiple dimensions of interaction|for the viability of multilateral cooperation when countries are linked by international trade °ows and transboundary pollution. We show that, while in some cases negotiation tie-in has either no e®ect or can make multilateral cooperation more viable, in others a formal tie-in constraint can make an otherwise viable joint multilateral agreement unstable.

Suggested Citation

  • Conconi, Paola & Perroni, Carlo, 2000. "Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-in in Multilateral Negotiations," Economic Research Papers 269329, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:uwarer:269329
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269329
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269329/files/twerp558.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269329/files/twerp558.pdf?subformat=pdfa
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.269329?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 1997. "Multilateral tariff cooperation during the formation of customs unions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 91-123, February.
    2. Josh Ederington, 2001. "International Coordination of Trade and Domestic Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1580-1593, December.
    3. repec:syd:wpaper:9713 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1997. "Multilateral Tariff Cooperation during the Formation of Free Trade Areas," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(2), pages 291-319, May.
    5. Elhanan Helpman & Assaf Razin (ed.), 1991. "International Trade and Trade Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262081997, December.
    6. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1993. "Multilateral Tarriff Cooperation During the Formation of Regional Free Trade Areas," NBER Working Papers 4364, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Raymond RIEZMAN, 2013. "Customs Unions and the Core," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Raymond Riezman (ed.), International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 3, pages 33-43, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    8. Lisandro Abrego & Carlo Perroni & John Whalley & Randall M. Wigle, 2001. "Trade and Environment: Bargaining Outcomes from Linked Negotiations," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(3), pages 414-428, August.
    9. John Kennan & Raymond Riezman, 2013. "Optimal Tariff Equilibria with Customs Unions," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Raymond Riezman (ed.), International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 5, pages 53-66, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    10. Burbidge, John B. & James A. DePater & Gordon M. Meyers & Abhijit Sengupta, 1997. "A Coalition-Formation Approach to Equilibrium Federations and Trading Blocs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 940-956, December.
    11. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
    12. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March.
    13. Sebenius, James K., 1983. "Negotiation arithmetic: adding and subtracting issues and parties," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 37(2), pages 281-316, April.
    14. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
    15. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 2006. "Theoretical Foundations of Negotiations and Cost Sharing in Transfrontier Pollution Problems," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 123-134, Springer.
    16. Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 190-214, March.
    17. Bond, E.W. & Syropoulos, C., 1993. "Optimality and Stability of Regional Trading Blocs," Papers 5-93-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
    18. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    19. Sang-Seung, Yi, 1996. "Endogenous formation of customs unions under imperfect competition: open regionalism is good," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1-2), pages 153-177, August.
    20. Bond, E.W. & Syropoulos, C., 1993. "Optimality and Stability of Regional Trading Blocs," Papers 5-93-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
    21. John Whalley & Colleen Hamilton, 1996. "Trading System after the Uruguay Round, The," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 62, January.
    22. repec:bla:reviec:v:9:y:2001:i:3:p:414-28 is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Joshua Greenberg & Wayne Thomas & William Workman, 1990. "Economic Evaluation of Reindeer Range in Alaska," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 38(1), pages 89-105, March.
    24. Carraro,Carlo & Siniscalco,Domenico (ed.), 1997. "New Directions in the Economic Theory of the Environment," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521590891, January.
    25. Daniel Esty, 1994. "Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 40, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Paola Conconi & Carlo Perroni, 2005. "Conditionality, Separation, and Open Rules in Multilateral Institutions," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5843, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    2. Conconi, P., 2000. "Trade Bloc Formation Under Imperfect Competition," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 571, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    3. Kyle Bagwell & Chad P. Bown & Robert W. Staiger, 2016. "Is the WTO Passé?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1125-1231, December.
    4. Carlo Carraro, 2006. "Incentives and Institutions. A Bottom-up Approach to Climate Policy," Working Papers 2006_49, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    5. Bond, Eric W. & Syropoulos, Constantinos & Winters, L. Alan, 2001. "Deepening of regional integration and multilateral trade agreements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 335-361, April.
    6. Carraro, Carlo & Buchner, Barbara, 2005. "Regional and Sub-Global Climate Blocs. A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Bottom-up Climate Regimes," CEPR Discussion Papers 5034, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Maggi, Giovanni, 2014. "International Trade Agreements," Handbook of International Economics, in: Gopinath, G. & Helpman, . & Rogoff, K. (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 0, pages 317-390, Elsevier.
    8. Mette Ersbak Bang Nielsen, 2006. "The endogenous formation of sustanaible trade agreements," Revista de Economía del Rosario, Universidad del Rosario, June.
    9. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1993. "Multilateral Tarriff Cooperation During the Formation of Regional Free Trade Areas," NBER Working Papers 4364, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Kamal Saggi & Alan Woodland & Halis Murat Yildiz, 2018. "On the Relationship between Preferential and Multilateral Trade Liberalization: The Case of Customs Unions," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Kamal Saggi (ed.), Economic Analysis of the Rules and Regulations of the World Trade Organization, chapter 9, pages 186-222, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    11. Carsten Kowalczyk & Donald R. Davis, 1998. "Tariff Phase-Outs: Theory and Evidence from GATT and NAFTA," NBER Chapters, in: The Regionalization of the World Economy, pages 227-258, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 1997. "Multilateral tariff cooperation during the formation of customs unions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 91-123, February.
    13. Staiger, Robert & Bagwell, Kyle & Bown, Chad, 2015. "Is the WTO Passé?," CEPR Discussion Papers 10672, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Burbidge, John B. & James A. DePater & Gordon M. Meyers & Abhijit Sengupta, 1997. "A Coalition-Formation Approach to Equilibrium Federations and Trading Blocs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 940-956, December.
    15. Aghion, Philippe & Antras, Pol & Helpman, Elhanan, 2007. "Negotiating free trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 1-30, September.
    16. Rodney D. Ludema, 1998. "On the Value of Preferential Trade Agreements in Multilateral Negotiations," International Trade 9802003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Sudhir A. Shah, 2006. "A Non-Cooperative Theory Of Quantity-Rationing International Transfrontier Pollution," Working papers 143, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    18. Sudhir A. Shah, 2004. "Allocations and manipulation in Kyoto type protocols," Working papers 125, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    19. Bond, Eric W. & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1996. "The size of trading blocs Market power and world welfare effects," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-4), pages 411-437, May.
    20. Thomas Kuhn & Radomir Pestow & Anja Zenker, 2019. "Building Climate Coalitions on Preferential Free Trade Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 74(2), pages 539-569, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade;

    JEL classification:

    • F0 - International Economics - - General
    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade
    • Q3 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:uwarer:269329. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.