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Value-based ITQ's

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  • Matthew A. Turner

Abstract

There is empirical and theoretical evidence indicating that quota-induced highgrading is aproblem in weight-based ITQ programs. This paper examines value-based ITQ programs as apossible solution to this problem. It is shown that value-based ITQ programs do not provide anincentive to highgrade, and may achieve a target harvest with greater accuracy than weight-basedITQ programs. Two ways of administering value-based ITQ programs are suggested. Though both are arguably more difficult to administer than a weight-based ITQ program, a value-based ITQ program may be less complicated than a weight-based ITQ program coupled with the sorts of taxes, landings restrictions, or multiple quotas, that have been proposed as remedies for quota-induced highgrading.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew A. Turner, 1995. "Value-based ITQ's," Working Papers mturner-95-03, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:mturner-95-03
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Parzival Copes, 1986. "A Critical Review of the Individual Quota as a Device in Fisheries Management," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 62(3), pages 278-291.
    2. Matthew A. Turner, 1995. "Economics without Free-disposal: Quota-induced Discarding in Heterogenous Fisheries," Working Papers mturner-95-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew A. Turner, 1995. "Economics without Free-disposal: Quota-induced Discarding in Heterogenous Fisheries," Working Papers mturner-95-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    2. Matthew A. Turner, 1999. "Uncertainty and the choice of quota program in a multi-product fishery," Working Papers mturner-01-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    3. Matthew A. Turner, 1998. "Optimal quota programs," Working Papers mturner-98-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fisheries regulation; tradable quota; value based quota;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law

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