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On 'informationally robust equilibria' for bimatrix games

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  • Reijnierse, J.H.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Borm, P.E.M.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Voorneveld, M.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Reijnierse, J.H. & Borm, P.E.M. & Voorneveld, M., 2007. "On 'informationally robust equilibria' for bimatrix games," Other publications TiSEM 376a74e3-b40b-4fcb-a277-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:376a74e3-b40b-4fcb-a277-ebc3d7d41005
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bagwell, Kyle, 1995. "Commitment and observability in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 271-280.
    2. Robson~ Arthur J., 1994. "An Informationally Robust Equilibrium for Two-Person Nonzero-Sum Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 233-245, September.
    3. Solan, Eilon & Yariv, Leeat, 2004. "Games with espionage," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 172-199, April.
    4. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
    5. Reny, Philip J. & Robson, Arthur J., 2004. "Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 355-384, August.
    6. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
    7. Hellwig, Martin & Leininger, Wolfgang & Reny, Philip J. & Robson, Arthur J., 1990. "Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 406-422, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. John Kleppe & Peter Borm & Ruud Hendrickx, 2017. "Fall back proper equilibrium," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 25(2), pages 402-412, July.

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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