Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games
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- Guth, Werner & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Ritzberger, Klaus, 1998. "Imperfectly Observable Commitments inn-Player Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 54-74, April.
- Gueth, Werner & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Ritzberger, Klaus, 1996. "Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games," Economics Series 35, Institute for Advanced Studies.
- Werner GÜTH & Georg KIRCHSTEIGER & Klaus RITZBERGER, 1995. "Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games," Vienna Economics Papers vie9507, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Morgan, John & Vardy, Felix, 2007.
"The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly,"
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- Morgan, John & Várdy, Felix, 2005. "The Value of Commitment in Contests and Tournaments when Observation is Costly," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt0s6752rf, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Felix Várdy & John Morgan, 2005. "The Value of Commitment in Contests and Tournaments when Observation is Costly," Public Economics 0504005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, Eric, 2002.
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- van Damme, E.E.C. & Bhaskar, V., 1997. "Moral hazard and private monitoring," Discussion Paper 1997-98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2002. "Moral hazard and private monitoring," Other publications TiSEM 432fc615-feb9-4c90-8a14-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- van Damme, E.E.C. & Bhaskar, V., 1997. "Moral hazard and private monitoring," Other publications TiSEM fcc97407-becb-465c-9856-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- V. Bhaskar & Eric van Damme, 1998. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 9809004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Takahashi, Satoru & Tercieux, Olivier, 2020.
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- Satoru Takahashi & Olivier Tercieux, 2020. "Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02875199, HAL.
- Satoru Takahashi & Olivier Tercieux, 2020. "Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs," Post-Print halshs-02875199, HAL.
- Werner Güth, 2002.
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- Werner Güth, "undated". "On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-48, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Lagerlof, Johan, 2003.
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- Johan Lagerlöf, 2000. "Policy-Motivated Candidates, Noisy Platforms, and Non-Robustness," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-17, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland, 2000.
"Perfect versus Imperfect Observability--An Experimental Test of Bagwell's Result,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 174-190, May.
- Steffen Huck & Wieland Mueller, 1998. "Perfect versus imperfect observability---An experimental test of Bagwell's result," Experimental 9804001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Giorgos Stamatopoulos, 2016. "Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(4), pages 553-570, November.
- Oechssler, Jörg & Schlag, Karl H., 1997.
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- Jörg Oechssler & Karl H Schlag, 1997. "Loss of Commitment? An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell’s Example," Levine's Working Paper Archive 598, David K. Levine.
- Brishti Guha, 2017. "Costly Leader Games with a Probabilistically Non-Strategic Leader," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(02), pages 1-14, June.
- Bhaskar, V, 2005. "Commitment and Observability in an Economic Environment," Economics Discussion Papers 8887, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Morgan, John & Vardy, Felix, 2004. "An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 401-423, November.
- Tanja Hörtnagl & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2014. "How the Value of Information Shapes the Value of Commitment Or: Why the Value of Commitment Does Not Vanish," Working Papers 2014-03, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
- Reuben Bearman, 2023. "Signaling Games with Costly Monitoring," Papers 2302.01116, arXiv.org.
- Jorg Oechssler & Karl Schlag, 1997. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell's Example," Game Theory and Information 9704001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 11 Apr 1997.
- Bhaskar, V., 2009. "Commitment and observability in a contracting environment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 708-720, July.
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JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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