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An "informationally robust equilibrium" for two-person nonzero-sum games

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  • Robson, A.J.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

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  • Robson, A.J., 1990. "An "informationally robust equilibrium" for two-person nonzero-sum games," Discussion Paper 1990-39, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:d1ce1029-d843-401f-a603-c25d8cc3e256
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    1. Robson, A.J., 1990. "Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies for Games where Payoffs need not be Continious in Pure Strategies," Discussion Paper 1990-38, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & David K. Levine, 2008. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 5, pages 67-93, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
    4. Matsui, Akihiko, 1989. "Information leakage forces cooperation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 94-115, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Reny, Philip J., 1995. "Local Payoff Security and the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games," Working Paper Series 435, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    2. Reny, Philip J. & Robson, Arthur J., 2004. "Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 355-384, August.
    3. John Kleppe & Peter Borm & Ruud Hendrickx, 2017. "Fall back proper equilibrium," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 25(2), pages 402-412, July.
    4. Reijnierse, J.H. & Borm, P.E.M. & Voorneveld, M., 2003. "Informationally Robust Equlibria," Other publications TiSEM 33cc6820-0b55-4510-8eba-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Hans Reijnierse & Peter Borm & Mark Voorneveld, 2007. "On ‘Informationally Robust Equilibria’ for Bimatrix Games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(3), pages 539-560, March.
    6. Rabia Nessah & Guoqiang Tian, 2008. "The Existence of Equilibria in Discontinuous and Nonconvex Games," Working Papers 2008-ECO-14, IESEG School of Management, revised Mar 2010.
    7. Lee, Natalie, 2023. "Feigning ignorance for long-term gains," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 42-71.
    8. Heller, Yuval & Mohlin, Erik, 2015. "Stable Observable Behavior," MPRA Paper 63013, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Nessah, Rabia & Tian, Guoqiang, 2008. "Existence of Equilibria in Discontinuous Games," MPRA Paper 41206, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2010.
    10. P.-A. Chiappori, 2002. "Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1138-1151, September.

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    Keywords

    Game Theory; Equilibrium Theory;

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