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The Sport League's Dilemma : Competitive Balance versus Incentives to Win

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  • Palomino, F.A.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Rigotti, L.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

We analyze a dynamic model of strategic interaction between a professional sport league that organizes a tournament, the teams competing to win it, and the broadcasters paying for the rights to televise it. Teams and broadcasters maximize expected profits, while the league's objective may be either to maximize the demand for the sport or to maximize the teams' joint profits. Demand depends positively on symmetry among teams (competitive balance) and how aggressively teams try to win (incentives to win). Revenue sharing increases competitive balance but decreases incentives to win. Under demand maximization, a performance-based reward scheme (used by European sport leagues) may be optimal. Under joint profit maximization, full revenue sharing (used by many US leagues) is always optimal. These results reflect institutional differences among European and American sports leagues.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Palomino, F.A. & Rigotti, L., 2000. "The Sport League's Dilemma : Competitive Balance versus Incentives to Win," Discussion Paper 2000-109, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:de46082b-0d40-4359-8f6f-fe402b3f0364
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Scott E. Atkinson & Linda R. Stanley & John Tschirhart, 1988. "Revenue Sharing as an Incentive in an Agency Problem: An example from the National Football League," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 27-43, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Falconieri, S. & Palomino, F.A. & Sakovics, J., 2002. "Collective vs Individual Sale of TV Rights in League Sports," Other publications TiSEM 922950b4-a0c9-4c2f-9cc8-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Eberhard Feess & Frank Stähler, 2009. "Revenue Sharing In Professional Sports Leagues," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 56(2), pages 255-265, May.
    3. Giorgo Sertsios, 2007. "¿Puede el Diseño de un Torneo Deportivo Afectar su Asistencia?," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 44(129), pages 59-89.
    4. Nicola Giocoli, 2007. "Competitive balance in football leagues when teams have different goals," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 54(3), pages 345-370, September.
    5. William Chan & Pascal Courty & Li Hao, 2009. "Suspense: Dynamic Incentives in Sports Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(534), pages 24-46, January.
    6. Dong, Zhi-Long & Ribeiro, Celso C. & Xu, Fengmin & Zamora, Ailec & Ma, Yujie & Jing, Kui, 2023. "Dynamic scheduling of e-sports tournaments," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    7. Michel Cavagnac, 2009. "Revenue Sharing and Competitive Balance When Teams are not Wage Takers," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 35(3), pages 299-313, November.
    8. Pelnar, Gregory, 2007. "Antitrust Analysis of Sports Leagues," MPRA Paper 5382, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Dmitry Dagaev & Alex Suzdaltsev, 2018. "Competitive intensity and quality maximizing seedings in knock-out tournaments," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 170-188, January.
    10. Matthias Kräkel, 2007. "A Note on Revenue Sharing in Sports Leagues," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 8(3), pages 309-316, June.
    11. Paolo Di Betta & Carlo Amenta, 2012. "The Media as a Policy Instrument in Influencing the Business Model of Professional Soccer: Evidence From Italy," Journal of Media Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(2), pages 109-129, January.
    12. Mattera, Raffaele, 2017. "Motivation, workout and performance - a model for amatorial sports," MPRA Paper 79243, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Stephen Easton & Duane Rockerbie, 2003. "Revenue Sharing, Conjectures, and Scarce Talent in a Model of a Professional Sports League," Industrial Organization 0303010, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Paolo Di Betta & Carlo Amenta, 2010. "A die-hard aristocracy: competitive balance in Italian soccer, 1929-2009," Rivista di Diritto ed Economia dello Sport, Centro di diritto e business dello Sport, vol. 6(2), pages 13-40, Settembre.
    15. Barajas, Angel & Crolley, Liz, 2005. "A model to explain support in Spanish football," MPRA Paper 3235, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    sport; competition; incentives; broadcasting industry; revenue sharing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L19 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Other
    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism

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