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On the Rule of Chance Moves and Information in Two-Person Games

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  • Dreef, M.R.M.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Borm, P.E.M.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

The value of information has been the subject of many studies in a strategic context.The central question in these studies is how valuable the information hidden in the chance moves of a game is for one or more of the players.Generally speaking, only the extra possibilities that are beneficial for the players have been considered so far.In this note we study the value of information for a special class of two-person games.For these games we also investigate how badly the players can do, both with and without knowing the result of the chance move. In this way one can determine to what extent the players are restricted in their possibilities by the fact that some information is hidden in the chance moves of the games.This allows for a comparison of the influence of the chance move to the control that the players have over the game result.
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Suggested Citation

  • Dreef, M.R.M. & Borm, P.E.M., 2003. "On the Rule of Chance Moves and Information in Two-Person Games," Discussion Paper 2003-100, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:54f11363-a82a-48ab-835f-0a6b49eaea42
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    1. PONSSARD, Jean-Pierre & ZAMIR, Shmuel, 1973. "Zero-sum sequential games with incomplete information," LIDAM Reprints CORE 149, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Reijnierse, J.H. & Borm, P.E.M. & Voorneveld, M., 2003. "Informationally Robust Equlibria," Discussion Paper 2003-14, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Voorneveld, M., 1999. "Potential games and interactive decisions with multiple criteria," Other publications TiSEM 29d7b372-7a4e-4db7-b66c-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Peter Borm & Ben Genugten, 2001. "On a relative measure of skill for games with chance elements," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 9(1), pages 91-114, June.
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    8. Marcel Dreef & Peter Borm & Ben van der Genugten, 2004. "Measuring skill in games: several approaches discussed," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 59(3), pages 375-391, July.
    9. Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 1975. "Zero-Sum Games with "Almost" Perfect Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 21(7), pages 794-805, March.
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    12. Bester, Helmut & Guth, Werner, 1998. "Is altruism evolutionarily stable?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 193-209, February.
    13. Marcel Dreef & Peter Borm & Ben van der Genugten, 2004. "A new relative skill measure for games with chance elements," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(5), pages 255-264.
    14. Jean-Pierre Ponssard & Sylvain Sorin, 1981. "Optimal Strategies in zero sum games with almost perfect information," Post-Print hal-00363923, HAL.
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    Cited by:

    1. van der Genugten, B.B. & Borm, P.E.M., 2014. "Cash and Tournament Poker : Games of Skill?," Other publications TiSEM edc02e9c-cda1-4531-b320-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. van der Genugten, B.B. & Borm, P.E.M., 2014. "Texas Hold’em : A Game of Skill," Other publications TiSEM e5edc6e2-5cad-4e87-8158-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Marcel Dreef & Peter Borm & Ben van der Genugten, 2004. "A new relative skill measure for games with chance elements," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(5), pages 255-264.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    information; games; control;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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