Peaceful Agreements to Share a River
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More about this item
Keywords
River sharing; peaceful agreement; contest success function; subgame perfect equilibrium;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2020-04-20 (Game Theory)
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