IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeeman/v130y2025ics0095069624001797.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

How to pollute a river if you must

Author

Listed:
  • Yang, Yuzhi
  • Ansink, Erik
  • Gudmundsson, Jens

Abstract

We propose the river pollution claims problem to distribute a budget of emissions permits among agents located along a river. A key distinction from the standard claims problem is that agents are ordered exogenously. For environmental reasons, the specific location along the river where pollutants are emitted is an important concern. In our analysis, we combine this environmental concern with standard fairness considerations. We characterize the class of externality-adjusted proportional rules and show that they strike a balance between fairness and minimizing environmental damage in the river. We also propose two novel axioms that are motivated by the river pollution context and use them to characterize two priority rules. We illustrate the rules through a case study of the Tuojiang Basin in China.

Suggested Citation

  • Yang, Yuzhi & Ansink, Erik & Gudmundsson, Jens, 2025. "How to pollute a river if you must," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:130:y:2025:i:c:s0095069624001797
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2024.103105
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069624001797
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jeem.2024.103105?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Claims problem; River pollution; Pollution permits; Externality-adjusted proportional rules; Priority rules;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:130:y:2025:i:c:s0095069624001797. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.