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The Price of a Price: On the Crowding out of Social Norms

Author

Listed:
  • Maarten C.W. Janssen

    (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

  • Ewa Mendys

    (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

Abstract

There is increasing empirical and experimental evidence thatproviding financial incentives to agents to performcertain socially desirable actions may permanently reduce other typesof motivations to undertake these actions.We study the impact of financial incentives on the desire for socialapproval, using the example of blood donation.We show that in a society with altruists and egoists, who all careabout social approval, introducing a payment intoa voluntary system may actually decrease the amount of blood donated.Withdrawing the financial incentive doesnot restore the norm to donate and may reduce the supply of bloodeven further.

Suggested Citation

  • Maarten C.W. Janssen & Ewa Mendys, 2001. "The Price of a Price: On the Crowding out of Social Norms," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 01-065/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20010065
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    social norms; intrinsic and extrinsic motivation; network effects; health policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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