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It is a theft but not a crime

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  • Balestrino, Alessandro

Abstract

Why do people who normally refrain from committing illegalities become digital pirates? In this paper we use a theoretical model of digital piracy combined with a game-theoretic mechanism of social norm formation to argue that no social stigma is attached to digital piracy because the latter has no perceived social cost; therefore, there is no pressure to build a norm condemning it. However, there also exists a "sophisticate" form of piracy focused on high-quality copies, and not on Internet downloads and black market purchases of low-quality copies like the most common form. Somewhat paradoxically, sophisticate piracy could help to generate a social attitude against piracy, because it is self-containing. However, it is limited in its scope, and it is difficult to predict whether it might ever become sufficiently widespread to effectively engender the formation of anti-piracy social norms.

Suggested Citation

  • Balestrino, Alessandro, 2008. "It is a theft but not a crime," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 455-469, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:24:y:2008:i:2:p:455-469
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paul Belleflamme & Pierre M. Picard, 2007. "Piracy and Competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(2), pages 351-383, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wojciech Hardy & Michal Krawczyk & Joanna Tyrowicz, 2015. "Friends or foes? A meta-analysis of the link between "online piracy" and sales of cultural goods," Working Papers 2015-23, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
    2. Michele Battisti & Ilpo Kauppinen & Britta Rude, 2022. "Twitter and Crime: The Effect of Social Movements on GenderBased Violence," ifo Working Paper Series 381, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    3. Douhou, Salima & Magnus, Jan R. & van Soest, Arthur, 2011. "The perception of small crime," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 749-763.
    4. Alessandro Balestrino, 2012. "Taxes, Status Goods, and Piracy," CESifo Working Paper Series 3704, CESifo.
    5. Carlos M. Fernández‐Márquez & Francisco J. Vázquez & Richard Watt, 2020. "Social influence on software piracy," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(7), pages 1211-1224, October.
    6. Anna Maria Bagnasco, 2012. "Economia della pirateria filmica: una ricerca esplorativa," ECONOMIA E DIRITTO DEL TERZIARIO, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2012(3), pages 433-448.
    7. Malgorzata Ciesielska & Dariusz Jemielniak, 2022. "Fairness in digital sharing legal professional attitudes toward digital piracy and digital commons," Journal of the Association for Information Science & Technology, Association for Information Science & Technology, vol. 73(7), pages 899-912, July.
    8. Traxler, Christian & Winter, Joachim, 2012. "Survey evidence on conditional norm enforcement," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 390-398.
    9. Łukasz Tomczyk, 2021. "Evaluation of Digital Piracy by Youths," Future Internet, MDPI, vol. 13(1), pages 1-26, January.
    10. Tyrowicz, Joanna & Krawczyk, Michal & Hardy, Wojciech, 2020. "Friends or foes? A meta-analysis of the relationship between “online piracy” and the sales of cultural goods," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    11. Koay, Kian Yeik & Tjiptono, Fandy & Sandhu, Manjit Singh, 2020. "Digital piracy among consumers in a developing economy: A comparison of multiple theory-based models," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
    12. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6913 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Alessandro Balestrino, 2014. "Large Taxes, Status Goods, and Piracy," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 70(1), pages 97-115, March.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

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