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A laboratory stress-test of bid, double and offer auctions

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Abstract

This paper reports on the empirical properties of the bid auction (buyers propose prices), offer auction (sellers suggest prices) and double auction (both buyers and seller initiate price quotes). These trading institutions are stress-tested using a nonstationary monopolistic market environment in which the buyers' demand schedule and the single seller's supply curve shift unpredictably between trading periods. The principal result is threefold. First, double-auction prices tend to be greater than offer-auction prices which again tend to be greater than bid-auction prices. Second, the listed ranking reflects tendencies only. The laboratory data do not support statistically significant behavioral differences between the three auctions. Third, trading is highly efficient regardless of auction type.

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  • Morten Søberg, 2002. "A laboratory stress-test of bid, double and offer auctions," Discussion Papers 327, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:ssb:dispap:327
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sequential auctions; experimental economics.;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General

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