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Do small family businesses have a peculiar attitude toward growth? Evidence from French SMEs

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  • Anaïs Hamelin-Schertzer

Abstract

This paper uses a very large sample of French SMEs to study growth of family owned firms. Firms range from total-family to minority control. The estimated relationship accounts for firm characteristics of size and, age, sector, and financial solvency. The results show that firms with greater family control are prone to exhibit lower rates of sales growth than feasible, given financial performance. Because firm growth is limited not by financing constraints but by family-related attitudes, increasing firm growth requires policies that shape incentives in small family businesses.

Suggested Citation

  • Anaïs Hamelin-Schertzer, 2009. "Do small family businesses have a peculiar attitude toward growth? Evidence from French SMEs," Working Papers CEB 09-032.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    • Handle: RePEc:sol:wpaper:09-032
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Small Business; Family control; Growth; Sustainable growth; Capital budgeting.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups
    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics

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