The Political Economy of Growth and Governance
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- Paul G. Hare, 2007. "The Political Economy of Growth and Governance," CERT Discussion Papers 0702, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University.
References listed on IDEAS
- Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009.
"Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,"
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- Anke Hoeffler & Paul Collier, 2005. "Democracy and Resource Rents," Economics Series Working Papers GPRG-WPS-016, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Besley, Timothy, 2007. "Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199283910.
- Serguey Braguinsky & Roger Myerson, 2007. "A macroeconomic model of Russian transition," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 15(1), pages 77-107, January.
- Daron Acemoglu, 2006. "A Simple Model of Inefficient Institutions," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(4), pages 515-546, December.
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Cited by:
- Grajzl Peter & Dimitrova-Grajzl Valentina, 2009. "The Choice in the Lawmaking Process: Legal Transplants vs. Indigenous Law," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 615-660, November.
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More about this item
Keywords
political economy; global economy; economic growth; governance; macroeconomic stability; property rights;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
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