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Competition among the elites, property rights protection and economic performance

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  • Shiyuan Pan

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  • Shiyuan Pan, 2011. "Competition among the elites, property rights protection and economic performance," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 104(2), pages 139-158, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:104:y:2011:i:2:p:139-158
    DOI: 10.1007/s00712-011-0198-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Humberto Llavador & Robert J. Oxoby, 2005. "Partisan Competition, Growth, and the Franchise," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(3), pages 1155-1189.
    2. Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "The Regulation of Entry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(1), pages 1-37.
    3. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "The Rise of the Regulatory State," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 401-425, June.
    4. Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, 1993. "Political Regimes and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 51-69, Summer.
    5. Antonio Ciccone, 2002. "Input Chains and Industrialization," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(3), pages 565-587.
    6. Edward C. Prescott & Stephen L. Parente, 1999. "Monopoly Rights: A Barrier to Riches," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1216-1233, December.
    7. George Economides & Hyun Park & Apostolis Philippopoulos, 2007. "Optimal Protection of Property Rights in a General Equilibrium Model of Growth," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(1), pages 153-175, March.
    8. Daron Acemoglu, 2006. "A Simple Model of Inefficient Institutions," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(4), pages 515-546, December.
    9. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422, September.
    10. Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A., 2006. "Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(1), pages 115-131, February.
    11. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-548, June.
    12. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1996. "Predation and Accumulation," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 333-350, September.
    13. de Meza, David & Gould, J R, 1992. "The Social Efficiency of Private Decisions to Enforce Property Rights," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 561-580, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. He, Qichun & Zou, Heng-fu, 2016. "Does inflation cause growth in the reform-era China? Theory and evidence," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 470-484.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Institutions; Competition; Property rights; Economic performance; Regulation; H20; O10; P16;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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