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A macroeconomic model of Russian transition

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  • Serguey Braguinsky
  • Roger Myerson

Abstract

We present a model in which capital assets can only be owned by members of a relatively small politically connected elite (‘the oligarchs’), each member of which faces a given risk of being expropriated, and we investigate the implications of such an imperfection of property rights for the transition to a market economy. At the start of the transition, the oligarchs are long on local capital assets but short on safe deposits abroad. This causes a depression phase characterized by acute liquidity constraints and large capital outflows at the same time. As the oligarchs acquire enough safe deposits, the economy enters a recovery phase, still accompanied by capital outflows. The model can parsimoniously explain both the steep decline suffered by the Russian economy in the first stage of its transition to a market economy and the subsequent turnaround. The decline could be avoided by allowing foreigners to own some domestic capital assets, but home‐country oligarchs may not be able credibly to collectively commit to such a reform.

Suggested Citation

  • Serguey Braguinsky & Roger Myerson, 2007. "A macroeconomic model of Russian transition," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 15(1), pages 77-107, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:etrans:v:15:y:2007:i:1:p:77-107
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0351.2007.00280.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jan Svejnar, 2002. "Transition Economies: Performance and Challenges," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 3-28, Winter.
    2. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/1cu21pio6c90g9i5oedr5hnaa3 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Sergei Guriev & Andrei Rachinsky, 2005. "The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 131-150, Winter.
    4. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1cu21pio6c90g9i5oedr5hnaa3 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Treisman, 2005. "A Normal Country: Russia After Communism," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 151-174, Winter.
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    7. Boycko, Maxim & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1997. "Privatizing Russia," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522284, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Benjamin Maury & Eva Liljeblom, 2009. "Oligarchs, political regime changes, and firm valuation1," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 17(3), pages 411-438, July.
    2. Yong Wang & Xuewen Liu & Xi Li, 2013. "A Model of China's State Capitalism," 2013 Meeting Papers 853, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Daniel Diermeier & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2017. "Political Economy of Redistribution," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 851-870, May.
    4. Guriev, Sergei & Sonin, Konstantin, 2009. "Dictators and oligarchs: A dynamic theory of contested property rights," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 1-13, February.
    5. Chakraborty, Suparna & Otsu, Keisuke, 2012. "Deconstructing Growth - A Business Cycle Accounting Approach with application to BRICs," MPRA Paper 41076, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Xi Li & Xuewen Liu & Yong Wang, 2015. "A Model of China's State Capitalism," HKUST IEMS Working Paper Series 2015-12, HKUST Institute for Emerging Market Studies, revised Feb 2015.
    7. Serguey Braguinsky & Roger Myerson, 2007. "Capital and growth with oligarchic property rights," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(4), pages 676-704, October.
    8. Olivier Blanchard & Michael Kremer, 1997. "Disorganization," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1091-1126.
    9. Francesca Spigarelli, 2011. "Outward Foreign Direct Investments of the Russian Federation," QA - Rivista dell'Associazione Rossi-Doria, Associazione Rossi Doria, issue 1, March.
    10. Paul Hare, 2007. "The Political Economy of Growth and Governance," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0337, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
    11. Karla Hoff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2008. "Exiting a Lawless State," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(531), pages 1474-1497, August.
    12. Grosman, Anna & Leiponen, Aija, 2018. "Organizational transparency and power in firm ownership networks," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 1158-1177.
    13. Serguey Braguinsky, 2009. "Postcommunist Oligarchs in Russia: Quantitative Analysis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(2), pages 307-349, May.
    14. Gorodnichenko, Yuriy & Grygorenko, Yegor, 2008. "Are oligarchs productive? Theory and evidence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 17-42, March.
    15. Djumashev, Ratbek & Abdullaev, Bekzod, 2017. "Crime, Transition, and Growth," MPRA Paper 80842, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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