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The Effect of Climate Change on the Probability of Conservation: Fisheries Regulation as a Policy Contest

Author

Listed:
  • Urs Steiner Brandt

    (Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark)

Abstract

This paper considers the policy outcome of a contest between two opposing in-terest groups: the incumbent fishermen and a group of conservationalists. The objective of the fishermen is to maximize profit, and they are (partly) concerned over future profitability as well, while the conservationalists have the aim of re-ducing current fishing effort in order to protect fish resources. The probability of a result of overfishing is dependent on the relative benefits the two groups receive if their preferred policy wins the contest. This model enables us to pre-dict how climate change induces changes in the underlying bionomic model and affects the probability of conservation. The main result is that the likelihood of conservation increases when climate change implies a larger percentage in-crease in the conservation value to the conservationalists than the percentage increase in the commercial value for the fishermen.

Suggested Citation

  • Urs Steiner Brandt, 2006. "The Effect of Climate Change on the Probability of Conservation: Fisheries Regulation as a Policy Contest," Working Papers 72/06, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:sdk:wpaper:72
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Johnson, Ronald N & Libecap, Gary D, 1982. "Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1005-1022, December.
    2. Ruseski, Gorazd, 1998. "International Fish Wars: The Strategic Roles for Fleet Licensing and Effort Subsidies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 70-88, July.
    3. Harald Bergland & Derek J. Clark & Pål Andreas Pedersen, 2001. "Rent-seeking and Quota Regulation of a Renewable Resource," Studies in Economics 0106, School of Economics, University of Kent.
    4. Brandt, Urs Steiner & Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 2003. "The coalition of industrialists and environmentalists in the climate change issue," Working Papers 03-18, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
    5. Urs Steiner Brandt, 2005. "Lobbyism and Climate Change in Fisheries: A Political Support Function Approach," Working Papers 63/05, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
    6. Epstein, Gil S & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2002. "Stakes and Welfare in Rent-Seeking Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 112(1-2), pages 137-142, July.
    7. Dijkstra, Bouwe R., 1998. "Cooperation by way of support in a rent seeking contest for a public good," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 703-725, November.
    8. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political contest; probability of conservation; fisheries management; climate change;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

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