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A Spatial Voting Model Where Proportional Rule Leads to Two-Party Equilibria

Author

Listed:
  • Francesco De Sinopoli

    (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics)

  • Giovanna Iannantuoni

    (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics)

Abstract

n this paper we show that in a simple spatial model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if the outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficient equal to their share of votes, essentially only a two-party equilibrium exists. The two parties taking a positive number of votes are the two extremist ones. Applications of this result include an extension of the well-known Alesina and Rosenthal model of divided government as well as a modified version of Besley and Coate's model of representative democracy. Different outcome functions are then analyzed.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2003. "A Spatial Voting Model Where Proportional Rule Leads to Two-Party Equilibria," CEIS Research Paper 31, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
  • Handle: RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:31
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ignacio OrtuÓo-OrtÎn, 1997. "A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 14(3), pages 427-438.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voting; Proportional Rule; Nash Equilibria;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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