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Cultura Organizzativa e Sostenibilita' della Governance Multistakeholder

Author

Listed:
  • Dragone, Davide

    (Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit)

  • Viviani, Michele

    (Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit)

Abstract

L'intento di questo contributo e' di mettere in relazione due categorie concettuali, quella di "governo multistakeholder" e quella di "cultura organizzativa". L'argomentazione si sviluppa attraverso l'esposizione ed il commento di due proposizioni diffuse all'interno della letteratura economica: la prima sostiene che la costruzione di un modello di governo multistakeholder possa contribuire ad accrescere l'efficienza dell'azione collettiva che costituisce l'impresa, tuttavia tale modello e' ritenuto di costosa implementazione, in particolare nel caso di eterogeneita' (di obiettivi e di motivazioni) tra i partecipanti. La seconda proposizione sostiene che la diffusione di una cultura organizzativa omogenea, contenendo i costi di coordinamento, sia uno strumento per risolvere i dilemmi di azione collettiva all'interno di una istituzione, anche se la riduzione della eterogeneita' culturale in un'impresa puo' limitare le capacita' di adattamento dell'organizzazione ad un ambiente mutevole. La multistakeholdership, concluderemo, e' nello stesso tempo implementabile in modo efficiente in presenza di una cultura sufficientemente omogenea, ma deve essere anche lo strumento per permettere una continua apertura ed adattamento della cultura organizzativa, in modo da scongiurare il rischio di un eccessivo irrigidimento della capacita' dell'impresa di leggere il contesto in cui agisce.

Suggested Citation

  • Dragone, Davide & Viviani, Michele, 2007. "Cultura Organizzativa e Sostenibilita' della Governance Multistakeholder," AICCON Working Papers 40-2007, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:aiccon:2007_040
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    governo multistakeholder; cultura organizzativa; stakeholder society; norma sociale;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values

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