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Welfare?Reducing Mergers in Differentiated Oligopolies with Free Entry

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  • Nisvan Erkal & Daniel Piccinin

Abstract

Antitrust authorities regard the possibility of post-merger entry and merger-generated efficiencies as two factors that may counteract the negative effects of horizontal mergers. This paper shows that in differentiated oligopolies with linear demand, all entry-inducing mergers harm consumer welfare. This is because if there is entry following a merger, it implies that the merger-generated efficiencies were not sufficiently large. Mergers which induce exit, due to sufficiently high cost savings, always improve consumer welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Nisvan Erkal & Daniel Piccinin, 2009. "Welfare?Reducing Mergers in Differentiated Oligopolies with Free Entry," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1081, The University of Melbourne.
    • Handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:1081
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Spector, David, 2003. "Horizontal mergers, entry, and efficiency defences," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1591-1600, December.
    2. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-126, March.
    3. Tina Kao & Flavio Menezes, 2010. "Welfare‐Enhancing Mergers Under Product Differentiation," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 78(4), pages 290-301, July.
    4. Cabral, Luis M. B., 2003. "Horizontal mergers with free-entry: why cost efficiencies may be a weak defense and asset sales a poor remedy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 607-623, May.
    5. Davidson, Carl & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2007. "Horizontal mergers with free entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 157-172, February.
    6. Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 473-486, Winter.
    7. Gautam Gowrisankaran, 1999. "A Dynamic Model of Endogenous Horizonal Mergers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(1), pages 56-83, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kovác, Eugen & Vinogradov, Viatcheslav & Zigic, Kresimir, 2010. "Technological leadership and persistence of monopoly under endogenous entry: Static versus dynamic analysis," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(8), pages 1421-1441, August.
    2. Federico Etro, 2014. "The Theory Of Endogenous Market Structures," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(5), pages 804-830, December.
    3. Etro, Federico, 2016. "Research in economics and industrial organization," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 511-517.
    4. Simon P. Anderson, Nisvan Erkal and, 2009. "Aggregative Oligopoly Games with Entry," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1175, The University of Melbourne, revised 2013.
    5. Luis Gautier & Mahelet G. Fikru, 2024. "Welfare Impact of New Firm Acquisition," Natural Resource Management and Policy, in: Handbook of Merger Control and Environmental Policy, chapter 0, pages 105-132, Springer.
    6. Luis Gautier & Mahelet G. Fikru, 2024. "The Design of Emission Taxes in Markets with New Firm Acquisitions," Natural Resource Management and Policy, in: Handbook of Merger Control and Environmental Policy, chapter 0, pages 225-243, Springer.
    7. Kai Hüschelrath & Kathrin Müller, 2015. "Market Power, Efficiencies, and Entry Evidence from an Airline Merger," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(4), pages 239-255, June.
    8. Han, Aiping & Ge, Jianping & Lei, Yalin, 2016. "Vertical vs. horizontal integration: Game analysis for the rare earth industrial integration in China," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 149-159.
    9. Federico Etro, 2014. "Some thoughts on the Sutton approach," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 112(2), pages 99-113, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Horizontal mergers; product differentiation; entry; cost efficiencies; antitrust policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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