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Endogenous market structures and antitrust policy

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  • Federico Etro

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  • Federico Etro, 2010. "Endogenous market structures and antitrust policy," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 57(1), pages 9-45, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:57:y:2010:i:1:p:9-45
    DOI: 10.1007/s12232-009-0088-3
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    29. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
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    33. Daughety, Andrew F, 1990. "Beneficial Concentration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1231-1237, December.
    34. Federico Etro, 2011. "Endogenous Market Structures And Strategic Trade Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 52(1), pages 63-84, February.
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    38. Creane, Anthony & Konishi, Hideo, 2009. "The unilateral incentives for technology transfers: Predation (and deterrence) by proxy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 379-389, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Federico Etro, 2012. "Leadership in Multi-sided Markets and Dominance in Online Advertising," Chapters, in: Joseph E. Harrington Jr & Yannis Katsoulacos (ed.), Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation, chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Panos Fousekis, 2016. "Member Coordination Costs and Spatial Entry Deterrence in a Mixed Duopsony with a Cooperative," Spatial Economic Analysis, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 340-354, July.
    3. Batlome Janjgava, 2013. "Free Entry and Social Efficiency under Unknown Demand Parameters," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp495, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    4. Etro, Federico, 2013. "Advertising and search engines. A model of leadership in search advertising," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 25-38.
    5. Cato, Susumu & Oki, Ryoko, 2011. "The top-dog and the lean and hungry look strategies in endogenous entry," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 2776-2782.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Antitrust; Endogenous entry; Leadership; Chicago school; L1;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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