IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/rdg/emxxdp/em-dp2019-16.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Higher education fees as signals

Author

Abstract

This paper argues that the fees paid for a degree may reveal private information about ability. In contrast with traditional signalling models, degrees need not be costlier for low-ability workers to acquire. This result follows when the labour market learns workers' types with delay, but only if their job requires high ability. Fees induce a separating equilibrium when they exceed the benefit of a low ability worker "passing" as high ability early in their career but are less than the life cycle penalty which high ability types would suffer. Raising fees in this setting exacerbates rather than ameliorates inefficient credentialing.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven Jacob Bosworth, 2019. "Higher education fees as signals," Economics Discussion Papers em-dp2019-16, Department of Economics, University of Reading.
  • Handle: RePEc:rdg:emxxdp:em-dp2019-16
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.reading.ac.uk/web/FILES/economics/emdp201916.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joseph G. Altonji & Charles R. Pierret, 1998. "Employer Learning and the Signalling Value of Education," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Isao Ohashi & Toshiaki Tachibanaki (ed.), Internal Labour Markets, Incentives and Employment, chapter 8, pages 159-195, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. Patrick J. Bayer & Peter Arcidiacono & Aurel Hizmo, 2010. "Web Appendix: Beyond Signaling and Human Capital: Education and the Revelation of Ability," Working Papers 10-52, Duke University, Department of Economics.
    3. Joseph G. Altonji & Charles R. Pierret, 2001. "Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(1), pages 313-350.
    4. Peter Arcidiacono & Patrick Bayer & Aurel Hizmo, 2010. "Beyond Signaling and Human Capital: Education and the Revelation of Ability," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 76-104, October.
    5. Henry S. Farber & Robert Gibbons, 1996. "Learning and Wage Dynamics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(4), pages 1007-1047.
    6. Behrman, J.R. & Kletzer, L.G. & Schapiro, M.O., 1992. "The College Investment Decision: Direct and Indirect Effects of Family Background Choice Postsecondary Enrollment and Quality," Papers 9201, Southern California - Department of Economics.
    7. Michael S. McPherson & Morton Owen Schapiro & Lori G. Kletzer & Jere R. Behrman, 1992. "The College Investment Decision: Direct and Indirect Effects of Family Background on Choice of Postsecondary Enrollment and Quality," Williams Project on the Economics of Higher Education DP-18, Department of Economics, Williams College.
    8. Josh Angrist & David Autor & Sally Hudson & Amanda Pallais, 2015. "Evaluating Econometric Evaluations of Post-Secondary Aid," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(5), pages 502-507, May.
    9. Fabian Lange, 2007. "The Speed of Employer Learning," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 1-35.
    10. Steffen Habermalz, 2011. "The speed of employer learning and job market signalling revisited," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(7), pages 607-610.
    11. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Prat, Julien, 2012. "Job market signaling and employer learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1787-1817.
    12. Canton, Erik & de Jong, Frank, 2005. "The demand for higher education in The Netherlands, 1950-1999," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 651-663, December.
    13. Philip Oreopoulos & Till von Wachter & Andrew Heisz, 2012. "The Short- and Long-Term Career Effects of Graduating in a Recession," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 1-29, January.
    14. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Theodore Koutmeridis, 2013. "The Market for "Rough Diamonds": Information, Finance and Wage Inequality," CDMA Working Paper Series 201307, Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis, revised 14 Oct 2013.
    2. Daniel Kreisman & Jonathan Smith & Bondi Arifin, 2023. "Labor Market Signaling and the Value of College: Evidence from Resumes and the Truth," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 58(6), pages 1820-1849.
    3. Mahmut Ablay & Fabian Lange, 2023. "Approaches to learn about employer learning," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(2), pages 343-356, May.
    4. Gaurab Aryal & Manudeep Bhuller & Fabian Lange, 2022. "Signaling and Employer Learning with Instruments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(5), pages 1669-1702, May.
    5. Wang, Jun & Li, Bo, 2020. "Does employer learning with statistical discrimination exist in China? Evidence from Chinese Micro Survey Data," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 319-333.
    6. Hani Mansour, 2012. "Does Employer Learning Vary by Occupation?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 415-444.
    7. Georg Graetz, 2021. "On the interpretation of diploma wage effects estimated by regression discontinuity designs," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(1), pages 228-258, February.
    8. Audrey Light & Andrew McGee, 2015. "Employer Learning and the “Importance†of Skills," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 50(1), pages 72-107.
    9. Nick Huntington-Klein, 2021. "Human capital versus signaling is empirically unresolvable," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 60(5), pages 2499-2531, May.
    10. Bond, Timothy N. & Bulman, George & Li, Xiaoxiao & Smith, Jonathan, 2016. "Updated Expectations and College Application Portfolios," MPRA Paper 69317, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Feng, Andy & Graetz, Georg, 2017. "A question of degree: The effects of degree class on labor market outcomes," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 140-161.
    12. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Prat, Julien, 2012. "Job market signaling and employer learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1787-1817.
    13. Sylvie Démurger & Eric A. Hanushek & Lei Zhang, 2024. "Employer Learning and the Dynamics of Returns to Universities: Evidence from Chinese Elite Education during University Expansion," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73(1), pages 339-379.
    14. Light, Audrey & McGee, Andrew, 2015. "Does employer learning vary by schooling attainment? The answer depends on how career start dates are defined," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 57-66.
    15. Graetz, Georg, 2023. "Imperfect signals," Working Paper Series 2023:10, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    16. Barbara Mueller & Stefan Wolter, 2014. "The role of hard-to-obtain information on ability for the school-to-work transition," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 46(4), pages 1447-1471, June.
    17. Audrey Light & Andrew McGee, 2011. "Employer Learning and the “Importance” of Skills," Working Papers 11-02, Ohio State University, Department of Economics.
    18. Graetz, Georg, 2017. "Human Capital, Signaling, and Employer Learning: What Insights Do We Gain from Regression Discontinuity Designs?," IZA Discussion Papers 11125, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    19. Lang, Kevin & Siniver, Erez, 2011. "Why is an elite undergraduate education valuable? Evidence from Israel," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 767-777.
    20. Andrea Gallice & Edoardo Grillo, 2019. "A Model of Educational Investment, Social Concerns, and Inequality," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 121(4), pages 1620-1646, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    signalling; employer learning; tuition fees;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I26 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Returns to Education
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rdg:emxxdp:em-dp2019-16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alexander Mihailov (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/derdguk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.