IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/rco/dpaper/505.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Do Narratives about Psychological Mechanisms Affect Public Support for Behavioral Policies?

Author

Listed:
  • Mira Fischer

    (WZB Berlin)

  • Philipp Lergetporer

    (TU Munich)

  • Katharina Werner

    (ifo Institute)

Abstract

Behavioral policy, such as leveraging defaults, is increasingly employed by governments worldwide, but has sometimes faced public backlash, which limits political feasibility. We conducted a survey experiment with a large, representative sample to explore how the narrative describing the psychological mechanism by which a default rule impacts a socially significant outcome affects public approval. Respondents are presented with a vignette in which an unemployed person follows a default to participate in further training. We experimentally vary the narrative about his reasons for doing so. Compared to the baseline condition in which no information on the psychological mechanism is provided, voluntary ignorance, involuntary ignorance, perceived social expectations and perceived social pressure each reduce policy approval. These factors also lead to more negative perceptions of the default rule's impact on the decision maker’s welfare and autonomy. The benign mechanism of deliberate endorsement, however, does not significantly raise approval or perceptions. We show that these findings hold irrespective of assumed preferences and discuss their practical implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Mira Fischer & Philipp Lergetporer & Katharina Werner, 2024. "Do Narratives about Psychological Mechanisms Affect Public Support for Behavioral Policies?," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 505, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  • Handle: RePEc:rco:dpaper:505
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://rationality-and-competition.de/wp-content/uploads/discussion_paper/505.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David Tannenbaum & Craig R. Fox & Todd Rogers, 2017. "On the misplaced politics of behavioural policy interventions," Nature Human Behaviour, Nature, vol. 1(7), pages 1-7, July.
    2. Raj Chetty & John N. Friedman & Søren Leth-Petersen & Torben Heien Nielsen & Tore Olsen, 2014. "Active vs. Passive Decisions and Crowd-Out in Retirement Savings Accounts: Evidence from Denmark," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 129(3), pages 1141-1219.
    3. Lex Borghans & Bart Golsteyn, 2014. "Default options and training participation," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 46(4), pages 1417-1428, June.
    4. Vincent Somville & Lore Vandewalle, 2018. "Saving by Default: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Rural India," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 39-66, July.
    5. Ayala Arad & Ariel Rubinstein, 2018. "The People's Perspective on Libertarian-Paternalistic Policies," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(2), pages 311-333.
    6. Samuelson, William & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1988. "Status Quo Bias in Decision Making," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 7-59, March.
    7. Hagman, William & Erlandsson, Arvid & Dickert, Stephan & Tinghög, Gustav & Västfjäll, Daniel, 2022. "The effect of paternalistic alternatives on attitudes toward default nudges," Behavioural Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 95-118, January.
    8. Jachimowicz, Jon M. & Duncan, Shannon & Weber, Elke U. & Johnson, Eric J., 2019. "When and why defaults influence decisions: a meta-analysis of default effects," Behavioural Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 159-186, November.
    9. Zacharias Maniadis & Fabio Tufano & John A. List, 2014. "One Swallow Doesn't Make a Summer: New Evidence on Anchoring Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(1), pages 277-290, January.
    10. B. Douglas Bernheim & Andrey Fradkin & Igor Popov, 2015. "The Welfare Economics of Default Options in 401(k) Plans," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(9), pages 2798-2837, September.
    11. repec:cup:judgdm:v:8:y:2013:i:3:p:202-213 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Ori Katz & Eyal Zamir, 2021. "Do People Like Mandatory Rules? The Choice Between Disclosures, Defaults, and Mandatory Rules in Supplier‐Customer Relationships," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 18(2), pages 421-460, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ericson, Keith M. Marzilli, 2020. "When consumers do not make an active decision: Dynamic default rules and their equilibrium effects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 369-385.
    2. Bruns, Hendrik & Perino, Grischa, 2023. "The role of autonomy and reactance for nudging — Experimentally comparing defaults to recommendations and mandates," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    3. Ismaël Rafaï & Arthur Ribaillier & Dorian Jullien, 2021. "The impact on nudge acceptability judgments of framing and consultation of the targeted population," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-03228638, HAL.
    4. Joshua Blumenstock & Michael Callen & Tarek Ghani, 2018. "Why Do Defaults Affect Behavior? Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(10), pages 2868-2901, October.
    5. Rotem Dvir, 2024. "Nudging citizens co-production: Assessing multiple behavioral strategies," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 57(4), pages 719-743, December.
    6. David J. Freeman & Hanh T. Tong & Lanny Zrill, 2021. "Default-Setting and Default Bias: Does the Choice Architect Matter?," Discussion Papers dp21-08, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    7. Altmann, Steffen & Falk, Armin & Grunewald, Andreas, 2013. "Incentives and Information as Driving Forces of Default Effects," IZA Discussion Papers 7610, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Beshears, John & Kosowsky, Harry, 2020. "Nudging: Progress to date and future directions," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 161(S), pages 3-19.
    9. Choi, James J. & Haisley, Emily & Kurkoski, Jennifer & Massey, Cade, 2017. "Small cues change savings choices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 378-395.
    10. Kirchgässner, Gebhard, 2012. "Sanfter Paternalismus, meritorische Güter, und der normative Individualismus," Economics Working Paper Series 1217, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    11. Lars Behlen & Oliver Himmler & Robert Jäckle, 2023. "Defaults and effortful tasks," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(5), pages 1022-1059, November.
    12. Katharina Momsen & Sebastian O. Schneider, 2022. "Motivated Reasoning, Information Avoidance, and Default Bias," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2022_03, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    13. Cox, James C. & Kreisman, Daniel & Dynarski, Susan, 2020. "Designed to fail: Effects of the default option and information complexity on student loan repayment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
    14. Macchiavello, Rocco & Casaburi, Lorenzo, 2015. "Firm and Market Response to Saving Constraints: Evidence from the Kenyan Dairy Industry," CEPR Discussion Papers 10952, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Lorenzo Casaburi & Rocco Macchiavello, 2019. "Demand and Supply of Infrequent Payments as a Commitment Device: Evidence from Kenya," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(2), pages 523-555, February.
    16. Eszter Czibor & David Jimenez‐Gomez & John A. List, 2019. "The Dozen Things Experimental Economists Should Do (More of)," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 86(2), pages 371-432, October.
    17. Karola Bastini & Rudolf Kerschreiter & Maik Lachmann & Matthias Ziegler & Tim Sawert, 2024. "Encouraging Individual Contributions to Net-Zero Organizations: Effects of Behavioral Policy Interventions and Social Norms," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 192(3), pages 543-560, July.
    18. Robin Maialeh, 2019. "Generalization of results and neoclassical rationality: unresolved controversies of behavioural economics methodology," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 1743-1761, July.
    19. Björn Bartling & Alexander W. Cappelen & Henning Hermes & Marit Skivenes & Bertil Tungodden, 2023. "Free to fail? Paternalistic preferences in the United States," ECON - Working Papers 436, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    20. Shimada, Hideki & Honda, Tomonori, 2022. "What drives households’ choices of residential solar photovoltaic capacity?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    behavioral policy; public support; psychological mechanisms; default rule;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General Welfare, Well-Being
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rco:dpaper:505. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Viviana Lalli (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://rationality-and-competition.de .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.