IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pur/prukra/1352.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Political Hare and the Stag Hunt

Author

Listed:
  • Yaroslav Rosokha
  • Xinxin Lyu
  • Denis Tverskoi
  • Sergey Gavrilets

Abstract

We theoretically and experimentally study an indefinite dynamic game intended to capture two main aspects of the political process – elections in which opposing factions compete by spending resources and policy-making in which those same factions are required to cooperate for the successful legislature. The main theoretical result is that limits on spending in the election contest increase cooperation. On the experimental side, we first test and confirm theoretical predictions and then explore whether such limits could arise endogenously. We find that a majority of subjects are successful in establishing a consensus on low limits, leading to higher cooperation and welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Yaroslav Rosokha & Xinxin Lyu & Denis Tverskoi & Sergey Gavrilets, 2024. "The Political Hare and the Stag Hunt," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1352, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1352
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://business.purdue.edu/research/working-papers-series/2024/1352.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political Economy; Endogenous Institutions; Dynamic Games; Cooperation; Coordination; Contest; Experiments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1352. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Business PHD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/kspurus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.